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SUMMARY 
 
After decades of research documenting the various processes of marginalisation and exclusion 
immigrants experience in their European countries of residence, recent efforts have been 
made to explore the extent to which these disadvantages are transferred across generations. 
Illuminating the barriers facing descendants of immigrants when trying to access labour 
market opportunities is a task of growing importance, and the ‘second generation’ – children 
of immigrants either born in their parents’ destination country or immigrating before 
adolescence – makes up a particularly relevant case for discrimination research.  
First, this group of individuals usually speaks the majority language fluently, and they 
have acquired domestic educational merits and work experience. As such, important obstacles 
normally assumed to explain many of the disadvantages facing immigrants do not apply for 
the second generation, making discrimination in hiring easier to detect. Second, although 
there are differences between groups, children of immigrants have on average achieved 
impressive results in the educational systems across Europe. If they are not offered the 
opportunity to translate their educational investments into relevant work, this has 
consequences both at the individual level and for the society as a whole. For individuals, 
barriers to employment may lead to social and economic marginalisation. At the societal 
level, widespread discrimination is economically inefficient and potentially a source of social 
unrest. Hence, the relevance of studying patterns of discrimination among descendants of 
immigrants is beyond doubt.  
Although it is important to assess the extent to which children of immigrants 
experience discrimination in employment, the research on second-generation incorporation – 
like the field of discrimination research itself – suffers from methodological problems in 
measuring the extent and causes of disadvantage. In traditional statistical approaches, 
discrimination can hardly be distinguished from social network effects; in employer surveys, 
the relationship between accounts and practices remain uncertain; in laboratory experiments, 
findings are not directly transferable to empirical realities; and in ethnographic field work 
among potential victims of discrimination, the representativeness of the exclusionary 
processes reported is notoriously unclear. Furthermore, theoretical models used in economics 
and quantitatively-oriented sociology have a tendency to favour single-factor explanations of 
discrimination at the individual level, not sufficiently addressing how organisational contexts 
may shape patterns of exclusion above and beyond individual motives and cognitive biases. 
This dissertation addresses some of these problems in the discrimination literature by 
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complementing a field experiment on discrimination in the Norwegian labour market with in-
depth employer interviews.  
In the first part of the study, a large-scale field experiment, in which hundreds of 
fictitious, paired résumés and cover letters were sent in response to real job openings, was 
used to measure the extent to which children of Pakistani immigrants are discriminated at the 
entrance to the labour market in the greater Oslo area. Because the two fictitious job 
candidates in each pair were equally qualified in every productivity-relevant aspect, but were 
randomly assigned a Norwegian or a Pakistani name, the direct effect of ethnic background on 
job interview offers is isolated. Hence, the experimental approach allows for a direct measure 
of ethnic discrimination in hiring processes.  
The field experiment leaves little doubt that descendants of immigrants indeed suffer 
from discrimination in access to employment in Norway: For the study in total, the probability 
of receiving a job interview offer is reduced by 25 per cent for the minority applicant 
compared to the equally qualified majority applicant. However, there are important 
differences within these overall results. For example, the discrimination rates are larger in the 
private sector than in the public sector, and there are significant differences across the 
occupations included in the study. These variations indicate the occurrence of different 
processes of exclusion at different locations in the labour market, pointing to the need for 
context-sensitive interpretations of the results from field experiments. 
In the second part of the study, in-depth interviews with a subsample of the employers 
participating in the experiment explore how, when, and why the ethnic background of job 
applicants comes to matter in decision-making processes. Supplementing the field experiment 
with employer interviews rests on a theoretical assumption that the field experiment literature 
has been too concerned with single-factor explanations at the individual level, in which 
discrimination either is caused by consciously acting employers or is due to cognitive bias. 
Conducting interviews with employers that received the fictitious résumés in the first stage of 
the study allows for a qualitative exploration of the hiring processes, acknowledging that 
although the experiment suggests a causal relationship between ethnic background and 
employment opportunities, there are several ways in which a discriminatory outcome may be 
produced. 
Indeed, the interviews suggest the need for multi-level explanations. At the individual 
level, many employers use fixed images of the ‘immigrant’ when assessing the quality of 
applicants with foreign names, regardless of whether the applicants are of the first or second 
generation. As economic models of statistical discrimination assume that employers use 
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accurate depictions of the average productivity level among different groups when 
considering job applicants – and there indeed are large differences in group productivity 
between the generations – the tendency to equate a foreign name with stereotypes attached to 
the immigrant experience supports social-psychological research on stereotypes and biases in 
recruitment. However, the interviews also point to the relevance of explanations at the 
organisational level. The qualitative ‘tracing’ of recruitment processes reveals what seems to 
be an interaction between the context of employment and the outcome of hiring decisions, 
indicating that means of bureaucratisation (e.g. formalised recruitment procedures limiting the 
room for employers’ discretion) may serve as a lever against discrimination in hiring. These 
results are in line with insights from organisational-level theories of workplace inequality, and 
they illustrate the relevance of combining field experiments with qualitative methods to better 
grasp the factors shaping labour market opportunities in modern societies. 
The dissertation consists of two main parts. The first part is an introductory chapter, 
presenting the main objectives of the research, as well as reflecting on the theoretical, 
methodological, and ethical underpinnings of the study. The second part consists of four 
scholarly articles. The first article reviews important methodological debates within the field 
experiment literature and presents the particular research design of this study. The next three 
articles discuss the main empirical findings and their theoretical implications. The articles are 
as follows: 
 
Midtbøen, Arnfinn H. and Jon Rogstad (2012), ‘Discrimination: Methodological 
controversies and sociological perspectives on future research’. Nordic Journal of Migration 
Research, 2(3): 203–212 
 
Midtbøen, Arnfinn H., ‘Discrimination of the second generation: Evidence from a field 
experiment in Norway’. Under review 
 
Midtbøen, Arnfinn H., ‘The invisible second generation? Statistical discrimination and 
immigrant stereotypes in employment processes in Norway’. Accepted for publication in 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
 
Midtbøen, Arnfinn H., ‘The context of employment discrimination: Interpreting the findings 
of a field experiment’. Accepted for publication in British Journal of Sociology 
 
8 
 
  
9 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................................... 3 
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................ 5 
 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 11 
 
THE NORWEGIAN CONTEXT ........................................................................................................................ 14 
Immigrants and their descendants in Norway............................................................................................ 14 
Immigration, integration, and the welfare state.......................................................................................... 16 
Ethnic inequality in the labour market ......................................................................................................... 17 
Explaining ethnic inequalities ....................................................................................................................... 21 
Discrimination of the second generation? .................................................................................................. 23 
 
CONCEPTUALISING DISCRIMINATION ...................................................................................................... 25 
Direct and indirect discrimination ................................................................................................................. 25 
Systemic discrimination and proactive measures ..................................................................................... 26 
Cumulative discrimination ............................................................................................................................. 28 
The definition of discrimination implicit in field experiments .................................................................... 29 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 31 
Individual-level theories ................................................................................................................................. 31 
Organisational-level theories ........................................................................................................................ 34 
Structural-level theories ................................................................................................................................ 36 
Theoretical framework of the dissertation .................................................................................................. 37 
 
METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS........................................................................... 40 
The field experiment methodology .............................................................................................................. 40 
The world of field experiment research....................................................................................................... 41 
Mechanisms of discrimination: Mixing field experiments with other methods ....................................... 42 
A multi-method research design .................................................................................................................. 45 
Multi-method social research: An epistemological contradiction in terms? ........................................... 48 
 
THE ETHICS OF FIELD EXPERIMENTS ...................................................................................................... 50 
An unethical approach to social research? ................................................................................................ 50 
The history of approval .................................................................................................................................. 52 
Ethics in practice ............................................................................................................................................ 53 
 
 
 
10 
 
SUMMARY OF ARTICLES .............................................................................................................................. 55 
Article I: Discrimination: Methodological controversies and sociological perspectives on             
future research ............................................................................................................................................... 55 
Article II: Discrimination of the second generation: Evidence from a field experiment in           
Norway ............................................................................................................................................................. 56 
Article III: The invisible second generation? Statistical discrimination and immigrant          
stereotypes in employment processes in Norway ..................................................................................... 56 
Article IV: The context of employment discrimination: Interpreting the findings of a field     
experiment ...................................................................................................................................................... 57 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ......................................... 58 
Do descendants of immigrants in Norway experience employment discrimination? ........................... 58 
How, when, and why does ethnicity come to matter in employment processes? ................................ 61 
Some reflections on the findings and their political implications ............................................................. 65 
 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................... 69 
 
THE ARTICLES.................................................................................................................................................. 82 
 
  
11 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
To what extent do descendants of immigrants experience discrimination in access to labour 
market opportunities? How, when, and why does the perceived ethnic background of job 
applicants become a matter of importance in employers’ decision-making? Decades of 
research in sociology, economics, and social psychology have dealt with questions of ethnic 
discrimination, and great empirical, theoretical, and methodological progress has been 
achieved. Yet major uncertainties remain. Statistical analyses of large-scale data sets, surveys 
with employers, and laboratory experiments exploring the relevance of negative attitudes and 
cognitive bias cannot directly measure the extent to which discrimination occurs in real-life 
recruitment processes. Furthermore, ethnographic research on perceived discrimination in the 
labour market cannot determine the effects of these processes on employment opportunities. 
The limitations of traditional approaches to discrimination research have substantial, 
theoretical and political consequences. Substantially, indirect measures of discrimination run 
the risk for both over- and underestimating the problem, allowing for polarised debates about 
a topic of unquestionable importance for a growing number of individuals in Western 
countries. Theoretically, models without ‘grounding’ in empirical realities are unable to 
explain how micro processes of exclusion lead to macro structures of inequality. In sum, these 
limitations have implications for social policy: Clarifying the extent to which discrimination 
occurs defines (at least to a certain degree) its relevance as a political issue, and theoretically 
grasping the processes by which ethnicity comes to matter has major implications for the 
accuracy of political means. As Barbara Reskin (2012: 18) recently pointed out, ‘[c]orrectly 
specified models are the sine qua non for effective policy intervention’. Hence, assessments 
of the extent to which descendants of immigrants experience discrimination in the labour 
market, along with an exploration of the mechanisms leading to discriminatory hiring 
practices, are particularly relevant contributions to this field of research. 
To address some of the limitations characterising traditional approaches to 
employment discrimination, this dissertation studies discrimination processes in the 
Norwegian labour market by combining a large-scale field experiment with in-depth employer 
interviews. In the field experiment, paired, fictitious résumés and application letters – equal in 
merit but with names signalling different ethnic backgrounds – were sent in response to 900 
real job openings in the greater Oslo area. As the experimental design isolates the ‘ethnic’ 
variable by eliminating every productivity-relevant difference between the two fictitious 
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candidates, a systematic differential treatment of the minority applicant is interpreted as 
evidence of employment discrimination. 
An exploration of whether the effect of ethnic minority background varies with 
gender, sector, and occupation was conducted by sending two pairs of fictitious résumés and 
cover letters – one female pair and one male pair – to job openings in twelve occupational 
categories in both the private and the public sectors. The sample included both low-skilled 
jobs and jobs requiring three to four years of college education. Pakistani names were chosen 
to signal ethnic minority background in the study because Pakistani immigrants and their 
descendants make up a large and well-known minority group in Norway. Moreover, as 
children of Pakistani immigrants constitute the largest single group among the second 
generation and are currently finishing their education and entering the labour market, 
exploring the extent to which this group faces barriers in access to employment is particularly 
relevant when assessing the situation for Norway’s second generation. 
Although field experiments are useful in measuring the causal effect of a foreign name 
on employment prospects, this method does not in itself provide much information about the 
processes by which the ethnic background of job applicants become decisive in recruitment. 
To explore the mechanisms causing discrimination in hiring, a sub-set of the employers 
inviting one or both of the fictitious candidates for a job interview received a letter 
encouraging them to participate in a follow-up qualitative inquiry about hiring practices. 
Forty-two in-depth interviews were conducted with employers from both the public and the 
private sectors and from a wide range of occupations. Although recruiting informants on the 
basis of a field experiment could bias the results in several ways, this approach also has 
certain advantages: By using the overall results of the field experiment as a backdrop against 
conversations on risk in hiring, experiences with and beliefs about minority workers, along 
with screening strategies and (formal and informal) requirements for final hiring, the 
qualitative material provides a novel glimpse into the factors shaping employers’ decision-
making. 
 The results from this research project are disseminated in four scholarly articles 
appearing at the end of this volume. The aim of the introductory chapter is to situate the study 
in its socio-political context as well as in relevant theoretical and methodological debates 
within the international literature on discrimination in labour markets. Section 2 presents 
important characteristics of the Norwegian context, which are crucial for understanding the 
historical, political, and institutional circumstances surrounding this research. Section 3 
discusses the concept of discrimination. Ranging from the straightforward, judicial definitions 
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of direct and indirect discrimination to a broader set of conceptualisations used by social 
scientists and legal scholars, I document the variety of phenomena included in the notion of 
discrimination and discuss how these are tentatively addressed by legal prohibitions and 
proactive means in Norway. Finally, I clarify what a field experiment of discrimination in fact 
measures and discuss which aspects of the discrimination complex are captured by the present 
study. 
Section 4 presents the dissertation’s theoretical framework. Discussing a range of 
theoretical perspectives on employment discrimination, I argue that theories at the individual 
and organisational levels are most relevant in explaining how, when, and why the ethnic 
background of job applicants becomes decisive in decision-making processes in the labour 
market. In section 5, I situate the study in the rapidly growing body of research based on field 
experiments and multi-methods and demonstrate that combining a field experiment with 
employer interviews is a particularly useful approach when aiming at identifying the 
mechanisms of discrimination in employment. Because field experiments presuppose that 
employers unwittingly are subjected to research and thus are not given the opportunity to 
provide an informed consent, section 6 discusses the challenges this method raises for 
research ethics and describes the ethical considerations made prior to the study’s execution. 
In sections 7 and 8, I briefly summarise the four articles and conclude by a discussion 
of the main findings and their implications. I highlight important topics for future studies on 
employment discrimination of descendants of immigrants and argue that field experiments, in 
conjunction with other methods, may provide powerful contributions to this important line of 
research. Finally, I consider the on-going debate about the role of discrimination in explaining 
ethnic inequalities and reflect on the bearing that this study has for the further development of 
social policy and anti-discrimination legislation in Norway. 
  
14 
 
THE NORWEGIAN CONTEXT 
 
Each of the empirical articles constituting this dissertation includes a short paragraph on the 
Norwegian context. However, as the article format does not allow for much detailed 
information on important contextual factors, this section elaborates on the size and 
composition of the immigrant population in Norway, the political context, statistics on 
unemployment, and former research on discrimination and ethnic disadvantage. I conclude by 
arguing why an experimental approach to employment discrimination of descendants of 
immigrants is an important contribution to this field of research in Norway and beyond. 
 
Immigrants and their descendants in Norway 
Immigrants from non-OECD countries arrived rather late to Norway compared to most other 
Western European countries (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli 2008: 13–14). In 1970, immigrants 
and their children constituted about 1.5 per cent of the overall Norwegian population. Among 
them, almost 50 per cent originated from the other Nordic countries, while only 6 per cent 
originated from Asian, African, and Latin-American countries (Statistics Norway 2010). 
As figure 1 demonstrates, the picture has changed rapidly since then. Through the 
arrival of unskilled labour migrants in the early 1970s, particularly from Pakistan, but also 
from countries like Morocco and India, and, later on, through substantial family and 
humanitarian migration, the immigrant population has steadily grown. After the EU 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007, Norway has, moreover, experienced a significant increase in 
labour migration from Eastern Europe, particularly from Poland and the Baltic countries 
(Friberg 2013).1 
As of 1 January 2013, about 14 per cent of the Norwegian population had either 
immigrated themselves (593,300) or were born in Norway to immigrant parents (117,100), 
and the immigrant population comprised individuals from 220 countries. There were 
immigrants residing in all the Norwegian municipalities. Oslo had the largest population of 
immigrants and their descendants, both in relative and absolute figures. Of Oslo’s 624,000 
                                                          
1 Norway is not a member of the EU, but as member of the European Economic Area (EEA), Norway is part of 
the internal market for the free movement of labour, services, goods, and capital. All EU citizens are thus 
entitled to apply for work in Norway, as in other EU and EEA countries.  
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inhabitants, 189,400 were immigrants or Norwegians born to immigrant parents, making up 
30.4 per cent of the capital’s entire population.2 
Of the different immigrant groups living in Norway at the beginning of 2013, about 50 
per cent had a European background, about 30 per cent had a background from Asia, and 
about 10 per cent were born in an African country. The largest immigrant groups originate 
from Poland, Sweden, and Lithuania, underscoring the increase in EU migration to Norway in 
recent years. Among immigrants from outside Europe, the largest groups are from Iraq, 
Somalia, Pakistan, and Iran, with the two former being the most rapidly growing non-EEA 
groups of immigrants in Norway (Statistics Norway 2013: 18).  
 
Figure 1 Immigrants and descendants of immigrants in Norway, by regional background. 1970–2013 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Among the second generation, defined by Statistics Norway as ‘Norwegian-born by 
immigrant parents’, more than 50 per cent had an Asian background, and by far the largest 
single group consisted of individuals with parents born in Pakistan, who constituted about one 
third of the second generation in 2010 (Statistics Norway 2012: 12). Descendants of Pakistani 
immigrants are also older than most other groups of the second generation: In 2011, 36 per 
                                                          
2 These numbers were collected from Statistics Norway’s website http://ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef 
on 3 May 2013.  
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cent were more than 19 years old, versus 20 per cent for Vietnamese and Turkish descendants, 
7 per cent for Iranian descendants, and only 1 per cent for Iraqi and Somali descendants. This 
illustrates that the second generation as a group is still young, but also that assessments of 
their incorporation in Norway are primarily a question of how descendants of Pakistani 
immigrants fare in education and the labour market (Statistics Norway 2013: 19).3 
 
Immigration, integration, and the welfare state 
The particular composition of the immigrant population in Norway may be explained by a 
combination of external and internal factors. The economic growth in the late 1960s made 
Norway an attractive destination country for labour migrants, resulting in the arrival of 
immigrants from non-OECD countries. Although not particularly affected by the international 
oil crisis in 1973, Norway introduced a temporary ‘immigration stop’ in 1975 in tandem with 
several other Western European countries at the time – making it a permanent measure from 
1981 (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli 2008: 202).  
As figure 1 illustrates, the ‘immigration stop’ did not block immigrants from coming 
to Norway. In fact, what was introduced in 1975 was the key principle in Norwegian 
immigration policy ever since: strong restrictions on unskilled labour migration, but access to 
the country for particularly skilled labour migrants (regulated by the demand in the oil sector), 
for family reunifications and new family establishments, and for refugees and asylum seekers. 
Until the EU enlargements in the 2000s reopened the borders for unskilled labour migrants 
within the EEA area, the major increase in immigration to Norway after 1975 was indeed due 
to family reunifications and access on humanitarian grounds (Brochmann & Kjeldstadli 2008: 
ch. 8). 
While the ‘immigration stop’ signalled that the Norwegian government wanted to limit 
the numbers of newcomers to the country, the rather strict immigration regulation was 
                                                          
3 The term ‘second-generation immigrant’ is somewhat problematic because it ‘sticks’ the immigrant category to 
individuals who might be born and raised in their country of residence. Moreover, it is often unclear which 
groups are actually included in the definition. For example, Heath and Cheung (2007) reserve the term 
exclusively to individuals who have not themselves migrated, but who are born in their country of residence to 
immigrant parents. This definition is equivalent to the term ‘Norwegian-born with immigrant parents’, as used 
by Statistics Norway. A broader definition, used, for example, by Portes and Rumbaut (2005), Thomson and 
Crul (2007), and Alba and Waters (2011), encompasses all individuals who have grown up in immigrant homes, 
thus including children of immigrants who either were born in their parents’ destination country or arrived 
before adolescence – what has also been called the ‘1.5 generation’. Although it might be useful to make a 
distinction between the second and the 1.5 generation, this study explores the employment opportunities for 
young individuals with Pakistani names who have high school credentials, college education, and work 
experience from Norway, and does not distinguish explicitly between the two groups. Consequently, I use the 
broader definition in this dissertation, and in the articles as well as in the introductory chapter the terms ‘second 
generation’, ‘children of immigrants’, and ‘descendants of immigrants’ are used interchangeably. 
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countered by a liberal integration policy intending to incorporate into productive work the 
groups already within the borders. This approach to the immigration complex may be 
explained to a large extent by welfare state concerns (Brochmann & Hagelund 2012: 13–14). 
On the one hand, welfare states of the Nordic, ‘social democratic’ type (Esping-Andersen 
1990), characterised by universal access to generous social rights for everyone with a legal 
residence permit, aim at controlling the inflow of migrants to prevent pressure on welfare 
budgets. On the other hand, existing resident immigrants must be swiftly incorporated into 
employment, as large groups outside the labour market represent a challenge to the 
sustainability of the welfare state. The result of this logic has been the dual face of Norway’s 
approach to immigration: restrictive border control combined with relatively inclusive 
integration efforts and active labour market policy – with the ambition of maintaining high 
levels of trust, solidarity, and social welfare in the new age of migration. 
 
Ethnic inequality in the labour market 
Although a generous welfare state relies on high rates of labour market participation, neither 
integration efforts nor active labour market policies have prevented persistent patterns of 
ethnic inequality in the Norwegian labour market. Substantial differences in employment rates 
between the native-born and the immigrant population as a whole have been relatively stable 
since the beginning of the 1990s, and particularly women with a background from non-OECD 
countries have had low employment rates compared to native women (OECD 2012b: 141–
142).  
The persistence of ethnic inequality may be illustrated by comparing unemployment 
rates for different immigrant groups over time. Figure 2 depicts the unemployment rates in 
Norway between 2007 and 2012, for the population in total, for immigrants as a whole, and 
for selected immigrant groups. Several points are worth noting. First, the overall 
unemployment rate in Norway throughout this period has never exceeded 3.6 per cent. 
Compared to the EU countries, which have experienced an economic crisis since 2008 and 
have an average unemployment rate up to 10 per cent (OECD 2012a), this unemployment rate 
indeed is remarkably low. Second, the figure demonstrates large differences in unemployment 
rates between the population in total and the immigrant population, with the latter being 3 to 4 
percentage points higher throughout the period depicted. Third, there are substantial variations 
between different immigrant groups. Immigrants from the Nordic countries have 
unemployment rates on par with or even lower than the population as a whole. Conversely, 
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immigrants from Asian countries have had unemployment rates between 6 and 9 per cent in 
this period, while the rates for immigrants from African countries vary between 10 and 15 per 
cent. Immigrants from Eastern European EU countries had very low unemployment rates until 
the financial crisis started in 2008, but were then hit harder than any other group. Since 2010, 
all immigrant groups have experienced increased employment, but the unemployment rates 
are still higher than in 2008. In sum, the relatively high unemployment rates among 
immigrants in Norway may indicate that they face restricted access to the labour market. In 
international comparison, however, unemployment rates are not particularly high for any 
group, clearly suggesting that the Norwegian labour market by no means is closed for 
immigrants.4 
 
Figure 2 Unemployment rates for the population in total and selected immigrant groups. 2007–2012 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Of course, access to employment is merely one part of the dynamics shaping ethnic 
inequality. After employment is secured, immigrants in Norway are incorporated into a labour 
                                                          
4 The field experiment which constitutes an important part of this dissertation was conducted between November 
2009 and November 2010, that is, during the last phases of the financial crisis. Although Norway was not as 
influenced by the crisis or its aftermath as most other countries, and the unemployment rates were decreasing for 
all groups from 2010 onwards, the experimental data was collected during a period characterised by somewhat 
unclear economic prospects, potentially making discrimination more widespread than would be the case if the 
experiment was conducted during less uncertain times. 
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market with large differences in terms of ethnic and gender composition. The Norwegian 
labour market is characterised by high employment levels for both men and women, but also 
by high levels of gender segregation across occupations (EGGE 2009; Jensberg, Mandal, & 
Solheim 2012; Reisel & Brekke 2013). In the large public sector, currently employing about 
35 per cent of the working population, 70 per cent are women, and in some occupations – like 
pre-school teaching and nursing – the female share is about 90 per cent. Conversely, male-
dominated occupations, like driving or working in a warehouse, are primarily found in the 
private sector (NOU 2012: 15: 148–150).  
Men and women of immigrant backgrounds by and large seem to follow the same 
pattern of occupational gender segregation characterising the labour market, with a few 
important exceptions: Men originating from non-OECD countries are particularly 
disadvantaged in attaining leading positions, and they are clearly overrepresented in the 
cleaning industry as well as in other low-income positions. Women from non-OECD 
countries, too, are overrepresented in cleaning, but seem to be closer to the overall female 
population in the other occupations in which they are represented (NOU 2012: 15: 153–154). 
There are also important sector differences in terms of immigrant representation: Immigrants 
are slightly overrepresented in the private sector and somewhat underrepresented in the public 
sector, mostly due to the high levels of formal education required for positions in the public 
sector (Statistics Norway 2009a). As such, both gender and ethnicity represent important 
dividing lines in the Norwegian labour market. 
Following the debate about the ‘modes of incorporation’ that characterise children of 
immigrants in the US, an important question arising from these features of the Norwegian 
context is whether a substantial portion of children of immigrants will experience downward 
assimilation compared to their parents (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001; Portes & Zhou, 1993) or 
rather will be structurally included into and contribute to changing ‘mainstream’ society (Alba 
& Nee 2003; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, & Holdaway 2008). Because Norway’s second 
generation is still young, there is so far no clear pattern of labour market outcomes. Still, the 
situation seems to be quite optimistic: On average, the second generation is close to the 
majority population in terms of education and employment, and some groups even outperform 
their majority peers. Moreover, the large gender differences in labour market participation 
that have typified certain immigrant groups, not least the Pakistani minority, do not seem to 
be reproduced across generations. In the period of 1998 to 2008, the gender gap in 
employment for Pakistani immigrants was 40 per cent. For their descendants of 25 to 39 years 
of age, the gender gap decreased from 20 percentage points in 1998 to 7 percentage points in 
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2008, clearly suggesting that descendants of Pakistani immigrants do not seem to copy the 
‘gendered’ pattern of employment characterising their parents’ generation (Statistics Norway 
2013: 53).  
 
Figure 3 Share of individuals active in education or employment, grouped by age, gender, and 
immigrant background. 2010  
 
Source: Statistics Norway (2012)5  
 
 
To illustrate the situation for the second generation in Norway more broadly, figure 3 
shows the share of individuals who were active in education or employment in 2010, grouped 
by age, gender, and immigrant background. Overall, the figure demonstrates that Norwegian-
born children of immigrants are closer to the majority than to immigrants, particularly in the 
younger age groups. Among those above 30 years of age, there is an increasing gap between 
children of immigrants and natives, while for immigrants the gap vis-à-vis the majority is 
larger irrespective of age. Importantly, age at the time of immigration is crucial for the 
activity level: Among children immigrating before they entered the school system, the activity 
level is approximately the same as for Norwegian-born children of immigrants (Statistics 
                                                          
5 The categories ‘immigrants’ and ‘children of immigrants’ in this figure consist of individuals from non-EU 
Eastern European countries, Asia (incl. Turkey), Africa, Latin America, and Oceania (except Australia and New 
Zealand). 
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Norway 2012: 27). It is also worth noting that the groups of immigrants and children of 
immigrants in figure 3 exclusively originate from so-called ‘non-Western countries’. 
Including descendants of immigrants from ‘Western’ countries in the EU and North America 
would result in overall higher activity levels among this group than for the majority 
population in the same age groups. 
The positive situation for children of immigrants in Norway is primarily due to their 
impressive achievements in the Norwegian educational system. Because they are still young, 
less is clear about how they fare in employment, but recent research suggests that the second 
generation experiences disadvantages in the transition between education and the labour 
market when compared to the majority population at the same age. Helland and Støren (2006) 
document that ethnic minority applicants of non-Western origin have to outperform their 
majority peers in order to have the same chance of obtaining apprenticeships, and Støren 
(2011) shows that ethnic minority youth do not have the same probability of being employed 
as the ethnic majority youth with the same competence and grades level. Furthermore, 
Hermansen (2013) finds that children of non-European immigrants experience weaker labour 
market attachments relative to the native majority, even when controlling for social 
background, although they seem to have equal access to advantageous occupational positions 
once employment is secured (see also Evensen 2009). These findings indicate that the second 
generation suffers from ‘ethnic penalties’ in the Norwegian labour market – in line with 
previous research in other European contexts (e.g. Crul, Schneider, & Lelie 2012; Heath & 
Cheung 2007). 
 
Explaining ethnic inequalities 
Structural features of the Norwegian labour market and the distribution of human-capital 
characteristics between different groups must be taken into account when explaining ethnic 
inequalities in employment. For individuals immigrating as adults, the Norwegian labour 
market may be difficult to enter because of the relatively small number of low-skilled entry-
level occupations, but also because extensive employment protection and restrictions on 
temporary employment make the risk of hiring high (Nergaard 2010). Moreover, many 
immigrants – particularly during the first years after arrival – lack Norwegian-language skills, 
and educational attainment and work experience from abroad may be difficult to convert and 
make relevant to the Norwegian labour market. In addition, a large fraction of the immigrants 
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in Norway are refugees, and this group has, unsurprisingly, lower participation rates than 
other immigrant groups (Statistics Norway 2010). 
Although institutional features of the Norwegian labour market combined with human-
capital differences are important explanations of the ethnic inequalities observed, statistical 
analyses show time and again that even when controlling for human-capital factors like 
education and work experience, immigrants in Norway face particular challenges for labour 
market inclusion (e.g. Birkelund & Mastekaasa 2009; Brekke 2007; Brekke & Mastekaasa 
2008; Røed & Schøne 2006; Wiborg 2006). Often, this is interpreted as an indication that 
discrimination by employers must be taken into account when assessing the causes of ethnic 
inequality.  
The relevance of discrimination in explaining ethnic inequality in the labour market is 
supported by a wide range of other studies from the Norwegian context: Ethnographic 
research has documented experiences of racism and discrimination among different ethnic 
minority groups (e.g. Aarset 2006; Andersson 1999; Andersson, Jacobsen, Rogstad, & Vestel 
2012; Fangen & Paasche 2012; Jacobsen 2002; Kvittingen 2011; Orupabo 2008; Prieur 2004), 
as well as employers’ reluctance to hire immigrants and ambivalence towards workplace 
diversity (e.g. Rogstad 2001; Rogstad & Solbrække 2012). Social psychological studies have 
shown how stereotypes and cognitive bias in employment may have adverse effects for ethnic 
minorities (Sandal 2009). And recent surveys of self-reported discrimination suggest that 
immigrants experience discrimination in the labour market (e.g. IMDi 2008; Statistics 
Norway 2009b; see also Rogstad 2004). In sum, these research efforts clearly indicate that 
immigrants experience discrimination in access to opportunities in Norway, although it is 
notoriously difficult to assess the actual extent of the problem based on these studies (see also 
reviews in Danielsen 2005; Djuve 2013; Seeberg 2011). 
 Importantly, many of the human capital-related barriers facing immigrants are not 
relevant for the second generation. Because they will usually speak the majority language 
fluently and have acquired educational merits from their parents’ destination country, 
obstacles normally assumed to account for many of the disadvantages facing immigrants do 
not apply for this group (Alba & Waters 2011; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi 2008; OECD 2010). 
However, assessing the direct role of discrimination in explaining patterns of disadvantage is 
also difficult when studying descendants of immigrants. A major problem in conventional 
statistical analyses is that omitted variables may hide important factors accounting for the 
residual gaps between the groups under observation (Blank, Dabady, & Citro 2004; Nilsson & 
Wrench 2009; Pager & Shepherd 2008). For example, it is well known from the classical 
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labour market literature that social networks have a significant effect on employment 
opportunities (Granovetter 1974), and more recent contributions have suggested that such 
network effects are distributed unevenly across groups, indicating that social networks may be 
an important explanation for labour market inequality (Petersen, Saporta, & Seidel 2000). 
Even when assessing the situation for the second generation, one cannot equalise the 
existence of ethnic penalties with discrimination. Omitted variables and social network effects 
may still bias the results, leaving unclear the role of discrimination in determining labour 
market opportunities. 
 
Discrimination of the second generation? 
A major aim of this dissertation is to measure the extent to which children of immigrants face 
discrimination when applying for work in the Norwegian labour market. For this purpose, a 
field experiment in which paired, fictitious résumés and cover letters were sent in response to 
real-world job openings in the greater Oslo area was conducted. The fictitious job candidates 
were equal in productivity-relevant aspects like educational attainment, work experience, and 
computer skills, but differed in that one of the résumés in each pair was randomly assigned a 
Pakistani name while the other was assigned a typically Norwegian name. Because the 
fictitious job candidates were young (25 years old), the résumés and cover letters were written 
in fluent Norwegian, and all schooling and work experience were from Norway, the minority 
applicants represented credible descendants of Pakistani immigrants applying for work. And 
because the two applicants in each pair were equally qualified, differential treatment of the 
minority applicant cannot be explained by different human-capital characteristics or unequal 
access to social networks. A systematic favouring of the majority candidate is thus interpreted 
as evidence of discrimination. 
This is the first field experiment of employment discrimination conducted in a 
Norwegian context.6 Focusing on the group of Pakistani descendants, the findings cannot 
easily be translated to other groups, not least because several field experiments in other 
countries have suggested the existence of an ethnic hierarchy in which some minority groups 
are treated far less favourably than others (e.g. Booth, Leigh, & Varganova 2012; Fibbi, 
                                                          
6 The empirical findings of this study have previously been published as a research report in Norwegian 
(Midtbøen & Rogstad, 2012b). A follow-up study, led by Professor Gunn Elisabeth Birkelund at the University 
of Oslo, has recently been completed. Here, the labour market of Oslo is contrasted with the labour markets in 
Bergen and Trondheim to explore whether the extent of discrimination varies by region. A field experiment 
measuring discrimination in the Norwegian housing market has also previously been conducted (Andersson, 
Jakobsson, & Kotsadam 2012).  
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Lerch, & Wanner 2006). This implies the need to exercise caution in generalising the results 
to the second generation as a whole. However, the findings shed light on the employment 
opportunities of a large section of children of immigrants in Norway who are currently 
finishing their education and entering the labour market and contribute as such by determining 
the role of discrimination in shaping their access to employment.  
To examine whether discrimination rates vary by gender, sector, and occupation, both 
a female pair and a male pair of fictitious résumés and cover letters were used in the 
experiment, and twelve occupational categories were covered in both the private and the 
public sectors. Considering the structure of occupational gender segregation in the Norwegian 
labour market, the female pair of fictitious job candidates applied to occupations dominated 
by women (e.g. within health and social work) while the pair of male candidates applied to 
occupations already dominated by men (e.g. transport and warehousing). This way, situations 
in which minority applicants of the under-represented gender were preferred or rejected based 
on gender rather than ethnic background, were avoided. To be able to compare the effects of 
gender more directly, gender-balanced occupations in financial services, teaching, 
communications, and public administration were also included in the sample. Both the female 
and the male pairs of fictitious applications were sent to openings in these occupations 
(although not to the same job vacancies), enabling an opportunity to explore possible 
gendered effects of ethnic discrimination. The implementation details and the results from the 
field experiment are presented at length in the second article of this dissertation. 
I return to the strengths and limitations of field experiments in the methodology 
section. Here, I also argue that supplementing the experiment with qualitative employer 
interviews opens up for interpreting the findings in ways not possible in single-method 
studies. In the next two sections, I clarify and discuss the concept of discrimination and 
present the theoretical framework employed in this dissertation. 
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CONCEPTUALISING DISCRIMINATION 
 
The concept of discrimination is controversial, partly due to problems of measurement, but 
also because it is used to describe a multitude of different phenomena. In this section, I begin 
by defining direct and indirect discrimination in accordance with the Norwegian Anti-
Discrimination Act. Furthermore, I discuss the broader concepts of systemic and cumulative 
discrimination and show how requirements of proactive means in the Norwegian labour 
market are developed in an effort to prevent some of these forms of discrimination from 
taking place. In conclusion, I relate the way discrimination is measured in field experiments to 
the discussion and demonstrate how discrimination is conceptualised in this study.     
 
Direct and indirect discrimination 
The Norwegian Anti-Discrimination Act, which came into force on 1 January 2006, prohibits 
direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, national origin, descent, skin 
colour, language, religion, or belief in all areas of society except for family life and personal 
relationships.7 Direct discrimination takes place when individuals or groups are treated 
unequally because of their ethnic background.8 Indirect discrimination, by contrast, refers to 
situations in which individuals or groups are treated equally according to a set of seemingly 
neutral rules or procedures, but when put into practice these rules favour members of one 
ethnic group over members of another.  
 Importantly, the Norwegian Anti-Discrimination Act defines as direct discrimination 
both actions that have the purpose of unequal treatment and actions that have differential 
treatment as an effect. Although a causal link between the ethnic background of individuals 
and the outcome of an action must be established to define acts as discriminatory, defining 
actions that lead to differential treatment as discriminatory implies that discrimination may 
occur regardless of the intention of the perpetrator. As such, although an act of discrimination 
may be motivated by racism, ethnic prejudices, or unconsciously working stereotypes, the Act 
does not in itself presume any underlying cause. The ban against indirect discrimination 
                                                          
7 When passed in 2005, the Anti-Discrimination Act supplemented the Gender Equality Act from 1978 that 
prohibited differential treatment on the basis of sex. Later on, an act prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of 
disability was implemented in 2008, and according to a recently published white paper on integration policy 
(Meld. St. 6, 2012–2013: 115), the Norwegian government is currently considering an act prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and sexual identity. Additionally, there are discrimination 
regulations in the general Employment Act (Ch. 13), which also prohibit discrimination in employment on the 
basis of political views, membership in trade unions, sexual orientation, disability, and age. 
8 For heuristic purposes, I use the term ‘ethnicity’ to cover all grounds in the Anti-Discrimination Act.  
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strengthens this perspective further: By acknowledging that disadvantages may be produced 
or reinforced even by neutral rules and procedures, attention is drawn to the fact that ethnic 
inequalities may be created independently of the intentions of individuals. 
 
Systemic discrimination and proactive measures 
Although the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination refer to a wide range of actions 
and procedures that may lead to ethnic inequality, social scientists and legal scholars are often 
concerned with broader conceptualisations of discrimination. Since the seminal work of 
Gordon Allport (1954), for example, social psychologists have argued that the formation of 
‘in-group loyalty’ often leads to ‘out-group rejection’ and ultimately to discrimination (see 
Fiske 1998 for a review). Applying these theories to the workplace context, Craig (2007) 
discusses how processes of exclusion occur as members of privileged groups favour co-
members of the same group (often called ethnic homophily or homosocial reproduction), 
while ‘out-groups’ systematically receive fewer opportunities in terms of training and 
development, promotions and work assignments, etc. Similarly, Sturm (2001) points to the 
subtle ways in which organisational cultures may shape patterns of interaction that over time 
exclude non-dominant groups. In an extensive study of all employment and housing 
discrimination suit files in the state of Ohio from 1988 through 2003, Roscigno and 
colleagues (2007: 10) argue that discrimination involves much more than direct exclusion; ‘it 
also entails differential treatment once employed or once housed, where the outcome is status 
hierarchy maintenance’. Focusing on ‘in-group favouritism’ and not simply instances of 
differential treatment at the point of initial hiring implies that the structures of advantage 
within organisations also must be taken into account when considering the dynamics of 
contemporary discrimination. 
Compared to incidences of differential treatment, these forms of ‘systemic’ (Craig 
2007) or ‘structural’ (Sturm 2001) discrimination are harder to prohibit by legislation, which 
normally protects individuals from differential treatment by providing the right to complain to 
a legal body when discrimination is perceived to have occurred.9 Due to the limits of 
prohibitions, these complaint-based models of anti-discrimination legislation have been 
                                                          
9 In Norway, the anti-discrimination enforcement body is called the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud 
(Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet). Victims of discrimination may pass their complaints directly to the 
Ombud. In accordance with recent legal developments in Europe, in which multidimensionality and 
intersectionality have been key concepts (Krizsan, Skjeie, & Squires 2012), the Ombud represents a fully 
integrated anti-discrimination enforcement body that covers all discrimination grounds protected in the 
Norwegian legislation. Furthermore, the Ombud is responsible for monitoring compliance with the UN 
conventions CEDAW and CERD (Borchorst, Freidenvall, Kontola, Reisel, & Teigen 2012: 71). 
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supplemented by proactive obligations to promote equality in Norway and in countries such 
as the United States and Canada, as well as in the EU (Craig 2007). In Norway today, all 
employers are obliged to take proactive steps to prevent gender discrimination and promote 
gender equality, for instance in terms of recruitment, income, and promotion. All public and 
private firms with more than 50 employees are, moreover, obliged to actively promote 
equality on the grounds of ethnicity and disability. The obligations are meant to increase the 
awareness of equality of opportunity in all aspects of employment implying, as Craig (2007: 
175) puts it, a shift in focus ‘from the compensation of individuals for unlawful discrimination 
to the transformation of organizational policy, practice and culture at the workplace’.10 
Whether these requirements represent effective tools in practice is another question. A 
recent survey among Norwegian employers (Tronstad 2010) shows that half of the 
respondents reported that the proactive obligations did not have any effect on their efforts to 
promote workplace equality, while about 10 per cent were completely unaware of the 
mandatory requirements. This may be explained in part by the lack of clarity as to what the 
proactive obligations actually entail in practice, as has recently been pointed out by two 
government-appointed expert committees in Norway (NOU 2009: 14; NOU 2012: 15). 
Another explanation probably relates to the fact that proactive measures are intended 
to change workplace culture and not simply the behaviour of single, discriminatory 
individuals. As pointed out by Robert Merton (1971), social problems that are direct products 
of deviant behaviour are easy to fight because they stand in conflict to the existing 
organisation of society. Social problems that are by-products of social organisation, on the 
other hand, tend to remain latent due to the ‘normative force of the actual’ (Merton 1971: 
816). Reducing systemic discrimination requires a critical evaluation of organisational and 
administrative structures and implies that the problem might be the normal policies of the 
workplace itself. This represents a major challenge for anti-discrimination legislation because 
it presupposes a psychological shift acknowledging that discrimination may be a part of 
everyday practices and existing workplace cultures.  
 
                                                          
10 The Anti-Discrimination Act also allows preferential treatment of ethnic minorities through positive action, for 
example to achieve ethnic equality at the workplace. However, this practice shall cease when the purpose is 
achieved (c.f. Section 8 in the Anti-Discrimination Act).  
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Cumulative discrimination 
Another aspect of discrimination which is even harder to minimise by legislative efforts is 
what Blank et al. (2004: ch. 11) have characterised as cumulative discrimination. According 
to the authors, there are three main ways in which cumulative discrimination can take place: 
First, discrimination may cumulate across processes within a domain of social life (e.g. the 
labour market). For example, discrimination in hiring or work assignments may affect 
promotion prospects and wage growth. Second, discrimination in one social context may have 
spillover effects on other domains. Discrimination in access to housing may, for instance, 
result in residential segregation, potentially affecting the quality of schools and in the longer 
run affecting educational and labour market outcomes. Third, disadvantages may be 
transferred from one generation to the next. The reduced employment opportunities or 
discrimination in income experienced by individuals may have direct effects on the well-
being of their children. Thus, children of disadvantaged parents may have reduced 
opportunities without being the subject of direct discrimination themselves (Blank et al. 2004: 
223–224).  
Related to the concept of cumulative disadvantage is what Reskin (2012), in a recent 
review of race-based inequality in the US, has called über discrimination. According to 
Reskin, sociologists have been too concerned with patterns of discrimination in particular 
areas of social life (education, employment, housing, etc.), preventing otherwise high-quality 
analyses from addressing the ‘reciprocal causality of disparities across spheres’ (Reskin 2012: 
18). The lack of a systems perspective on racial inequality in mainstream quantitative research 
renders invisible the potential feedback effects by which patterns of disadvantage are 
transferred across time and domains, and, as a result, prevents policy interventions from 
advancing racial justice.  
The notions of cumulative disadvantage and über discrimination highlight the need to 
address problems of discrimination that are not easily captured by national legislation. 
Nevertheless, it is unclear how these problems should be measured and how relevant these 
concepts are outside the particular US context. As Blank et al. (2004: 224) point out, it is not 
evident how the effects of discrimination may cumulate over time, not least because 
traditional research designs measuring discrimination at one point of the time and in single 
domains are not able to grasp the ways in which race and ethnicity may affect access to 
opportunity even in the absence of differential treatment. Furthermore, the US does in some 
respects constitute an ‘outlier’ in discrimination research due to its history of slavery and, 
later on, the Jim Crow system of racial segregation and discrimination. Thus, the 
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transferability of these perspectives to the European context is somewhat unclear, although 
the more general question of how inequalities may be reproduced across generations 
obviously resonates with concerns about the disadvantages experienced by children of 
immigrants in European countries of today.  
 
The definition of discrimination implicit in field experiments 
The different aspects of discrimination discussed in this section illustrate a variety of ways in 
which discrimination may be defined and conceptualised, both as a legal construct and as a 
phenomenon studied by social scientists. How the definition of discrimination implicit in field 
experiments relates to this variety is, however, not straightforward. Because field experiments 
used for research purposes construct situations or ‘tests’ in which employers are considering 
paired résumés of identical quality at one point of time, the single act of choosing one 
candidate in favour of another cannot be defined as direct discrimination because it could be 
the result of a coincidental preference for one out of two equally qualified job applicants.11 
Neither can it be seen as indirect discrimination, since what is measured is differentials in job 
interview offers and not discrimination due to equal treatment based on neutral procedures. 
Rather, the role of field experiments is to explore whether minority applicants are 
systematically disadvantaged in access to employment (Pager & Western 2012: 233). A non-
discriminatory labour market is not a labour market in which majority applicants are never 
preferred in favour of equally qualified minority peers, but a labour market where aggregated 
hiring practices are uncorrelated with particular ethnic backgrounds. Field experiments are 
useful in determining the role of discrimination in producing aggregate ethnic inequalities in 
labour market outcomes. 
 Still, one must keep in mind that field experiment research represents a ‘snap-shot 
approach’ to empirical realities. By sending hundreds of paired, fictitious résumés and cover 
letters, what is measured is the average ‘treatment effect’ of ethnic background on call-back 
rates at one point of time and in a specific geographical area. Thus, field experiments do not 
measure differential treatment in processes of wage negotiation, promotion, and firing – nor 
do they shed light on workplace cultures characterised by in-group favouritism or problems of 
cumulative disadvantage. This means that when field experiment researchers use the notion 
                                                          
11 But see the work of Arai, Bursell, and Nekby (2011). In this field experiment, the minority applicants were 
more qualified than the majority applicants, implying that the single act of inviting only the majority candidate to 
a job interview in fact represents a direct form of discrimination. 
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‘ethnic discrimination’, what is usually meant is the average effect of ethnically distinct 
names on the probability of receiving call-backs for job interviews.12 
 Obviously, there is no straightforward relationship between the names of individuals 
and their ethnic background. For employers, a foreign name might evoke associations to 
nationality, religion, or even social class that are as strong as the associations to ethnicity.13 
Moreover, as Barth (1969) has pointed out, although the word ‘ethnicity’ often refers to 
groups of people who are considered to have a shared identity and a common cultural 
heritage, ethnic identity is a matter of self-ascription and ascription by others in interaction. 
Studying only employers’ ascriptions, as is the case when conducting field experiment 
research, excludes important parts of the processes defining ethnic boundaries. Finally, using 
names to signal membership to one particular ethnic group makes general statements about 
ethnic discrimination imprecise because it implies that the results easily could be transferred 
to other groups. As previous field experiments have suggested that some ethnic groups 
experience more discrimination than others, the results from the present study do not 
necessarily speak to the discrimination experienced by other groups. 
The field experiment employed in this dissertation measures the extent to which 
descendants of Pakistani immigrants, when compared to equally qualified majority applicants, 
are systematically disadvantaged in hiring processes in the greater Oslo area. As such, I 
comply with the concept of discrimination used in other field experiments, exploring 
generalised patterns of hiring practices and not detecting consistent discriminatory behaviour 
by single employers. However, because the field experiment is complemented by interviews 
with a subsample of the employers subjected to research in the experiment, qualitative data on 
the contexts of employment is also collected. By linking the experimental results to the 
employer’s reported beliefs about minority workers as well as to characteristics of the 
employment processes, the two data sources broaden the understanding of how and why the 
ethnic background of job applicants comes to matter in decision-making processes in the 
Norwegian labour market. Moreover, by exploring the extent to which descendants of 
immigrants experience discrimination in access to employment, the reproduction of ethnic 
inequalities across generations is also indirectly studied. As such, this dissertation addresses 
key dimensions of how discrimination shapes labour market opportunities in Norway.   
                                                          
12 Field experiments may also measure actual job offers if a so-called in-person audit study is used instead of a 
correspondence study. I return to the distinction between these two techniques in the methodology section.  
13 See article II for a thorough discussion of whether a name primarily signals ethnic or racial background, or 
rather if social class, religious affiliations, or national origin may be equally important categories inferred by 
employers when viewing the names of applicants. 
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
The main aims of this research are to assess the extent to which ethnic discrimination in the 
Norwegian labour market occurs and to provide a clearer picture of how, when, and why 
discriminatory hiring practices take place. Both of these objectives make relevant a wide 
range of theoretical perspectives. In this section, I discuss theories of discrimination at the 
individual, organisational, and structural levels. In the conclusion, I present the theoretical 
framework employed in the dissertation, arguing why certain perspectives are more relevant 
than others in grasping the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion in hiring.  
 
Individual-level theories 
Theorising in the field of discrimination research has primarily been concerned with 
explanations at the individual level. This is probably a result of the close relationship between 
discrimination and individual behaviour, as the phenomenon to be explained – at least in 
labour market studies – normally is the very act of differential treatment by members of the 
majority or dominant group towards members of minority or underprivileged groups. 
Economists and most quantitatively oriented sociologists usually take the traditional 
distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination as their point of departure when 
discussing why discrimination occurs. The idea of individuals having a ‘taste’ for 
discrimination originates from Gary Becker’s seminal book The Economics of Discrimination 
(1957), where he discusses the economic effects of racial discrimination in the US labour 
market. According to Becker, racial discrimination is the result of an employer’s willingness 
to pay for not being associated with ‘blacks’ – either by rejecting the most productive 
candidates or by offering a reduced income. In this model, discrimination is explained with 
reference to direct racial animus among employers because the behaviour lacks ‘objectivity’. 
According to Becker, objective behaviour is based on considerations of productivity alone, 
and discrimination is thus a result of employers acting on the basis of subjective preferences. 
As such, an underlying assumption in this theory is that discriminatory employers over time 
will be crowded out of the labour market because their behaviour constitutes a threat to 
productivity.  
In contrast to the assumption that discrimination and productivity are mutually 
exclusive, economic models of statistical discrimination, originating from the work of Phelps 
(1972) and Arrow (1973), rest on the idea that discrimination is a way of managing the 
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imperfect information that characterises hiring decisions and wage-setting in the labour 
market. According to Phelps (1972: 659), ‘the employer who seeks to maximize expected 
profit will discriminate against blacks or women if he believes them to be less qualified, 
reliable, long-term, etc. on the average than whites and men, respectively, and if the cost of 
information about the individual applicants is excessive’. In the absence of full information, 
skin colour and sex will be used as proxies for productivity. According to this theory, risk-
aversive employers will hire the candidate who is ascribed membership to the group that has 
the highest average productivity – presumably ‘whites’ and men.  
The main difference between taste-based and statistical discrimination is the notion of 
rationality. Excluding the most productive job applicant on the grounds of race or sex is 
economically inefficient, while hiring decisions based on estimates of group productivity are 
assumed to be rational (although still discriminatory) responses to the uncertainty and lack of 
full information characterising hiring decisions in the labour market. Both uncertainty and 
lack of information are inevitable parts of recruitment processes, and a characteristic of 
organisational behaviour as such (Stinchcombe 1990). Nevertheless, an unclear aspect of 
statistical discrimination models is the question of accuracy in employers’ beliefs about 
average group productivity. Both Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973) are somewhat vague on 
this point, indicating – perhaps – that their models allow for employers’ beliefs about blacks 
and women to be inaccurate depictions of reality and still be ‘rational’ in some sense. 
In efforts to clarify this point, other economists have defined statistical discrimination 
as a situation where employers act on the basis of ‘true stereotypes’ (Schwab 1986: 228) and 
have argued strongly that average differences in productivity between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’, 
men and women, actually exist and that this difference is the basis of discrimination (Aigner 
& Cain 1977). Moreover, an entire branch of the economics literature is concerned with so-
called employer learning (e.g. Altonji & Pierret 2001; Farber & Gibbons 1996). These 
scholars acknowledge that statistical discrimination may be based on outdated beliefs about 
group productivity, but argue that employers who have positive experiences with stigmatised 
minority groups over time will update their beliefs to be in accordance with empirical realities 
(Farmer & Terrell 1996).  
Many sociologists have criticised economic models of statistical discrimination, 
questioning the idea of accuracy in beliefs about group productivity (e.g. Bielby & Baron 
1986; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs 1999), along with the assumption that employers update 
their views of racial minorities when new and positive information is provided (Pager & 
Karafin 2009). The idea that employers are guided by ‘true stereotypes’ stands, for example, 
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in striking contrast to Allport’s (1954) work on the nature of prejudice, where a stereotype is 
defined as ‘an exaggerated belief associated with a category’ (Allport 1954: 191; see also 
Fiske 1998). Indeed, important qualitative work from the US context demonstrates that 
employers use race and ethnic background as proxies for productivity, but that their views of 
minority applicants often are based on crude stereotypes (e.g. Kirschenman & Neckerman 
1991; Moss & Tilly 2001; Shih 2002; Waldinger & Lichter 2003). In this regard, England 
(1992) has made a useful distinction between statistical discrimination, on the one hand, and 
‘error discrimination’, on the other, arguing that the latter refers to discriminatory practices 
guided by erroneous estimates of group averages, typically based on stereotypes about 
‘blacks’ or women. Importantly, however, the notion of error discrimination shares with 
statistical discrimination the view that employers do not have a general distaste against 
particular groups, but rather act in a discriminatory way ‘in an effort to hire a more productive 
work force’ (England, 1992: 60).14 
Efforts to develop theories of discrimination that do not take individuals’ explicit 
prejudices and racist attitudes as a point of departure have been developed in the US context 
to reconcile the rather puzzling fact that ethnic and racial disadvantage seem to sustain even 
though attitudes towards minorities have changed in positive ways during the past decades 
(Pager 2007b: 106–107; see also Schuman & Krysan 1999). In fact, a range of theories 
attempts to shed light on this somewhat contradicting picture. One line of research is based on 
findings from the so-called Implicit Association Test (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz 
1998), arguing that employers’ actions are shaped by cognitive structures that negatively 
affect underprivileged groups in unconscious ways (e.g. Agerström & Rooth 2009; Bertrand, 
Chugh, & Mullainathan 2005; Quillian 2008; Reskin 2008).15 Others have developed theories 
of ‘symbolic’ (Kinder & Sears 1981), ‘modern’ (McConahay 1983), ‘laissez-faire’ (Bobo, 
Kluegel, & Smith 1997), or ‘colour-blind’ racism (Bonilla-Silva 2006) to direct the attention 
                                                          
14 Most sociologists would probably oppose the idea that statistical discrimination necessarily reflects true 
differences in average group productivity and agree that stereotypes about minority groups are important when 
explaining why discrimination occurs. In a study of ethnic discrimination in the Swedish labour market, for 
example, Rydgren (2004: 698) identifies ‘statistical discrimination (based on stereotypical thinking)’ as an 
important mechanism of exclusion. Tomaskovic-Devey (1999: 424) makes this point clear by distinguishing 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions of statistical discrimination theory. The strong version is associated with 
economists and assumes that average group differences actually exist, while the weak version, more often used 
by sociologists, assumes that stereotypes about productivity are more important than actual productivity when 
explaining employers’ discriminatory behaviour. In my opinion, it is useful to make a linguistic distinction 
between these two versions (e.g. like England’s [1992] proposal) as it is notoriously unclear what is actually 
assumed when scholars refer to statistical discrimination.  
15 See Petersen (2008) and Tetlock (2008) for important critiques of theories of unconscious or implicit 
discrimination. 
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from racist attitudes to the persistence of discriminatory actions, arguing that racism simply 
has changed expression from overt to more subtle forms (see also Loury 2002).  
While differing in important aspects, these theoretical perspectives demonstrate that 
the prevalence of ethnic or racial inequality indeed is reconcilable with a decrease in explicit 
racist prejudice. Although it is of great importance to study changes in racial and ethnic 
attitudes over time as well as acknowledge that progress in this area indeed has taken place, 
these theories demonstrate that social research must keep focus on the practices of 
discrimination regardless of their underlying motivation.  
 
Organisational-level theories 
Albeit important contributions to the theoretical conception of discriminatory behaviour, 
many of the theories discussed above implicitly treat discrimination by employers as a 
phenomenon that can be explained exclusively by single factors at the micro level. Yet hiring 
decisions are made within organisational and institutional contexts that affect the extent to 
which racist attitudes, risk aversion, or unconsciously working stereotypes are translated into 
discriminatory actions (Reskin 2003). 
 Studying the organisational determinants of discrimination has a long history in 
sociological research. In his famous theory of the modern bureaucracy, Weber ([1922] 1978), 
for example, described how formalised recruitment procedures constrain managerial 
discretion in hiring. Merton (1957), too, has emphasised how formal procedures in 
bureaucracies ensure control over affective decision-making. In the essay ‘Bureaucratic 
structure and personality’, he notes that ‘[s]pecific procedural devices foster objectivity and 
restrain the “quick passage of impulse into action”’ (Merton 1957: 195). More recently, Baron 
and Bielby (1980: 738) argue that the role of organisations in stratification research should be 
strengthened vis-à-vis both individual- and structural-level explanations, because ‘firms link 
the “micro” and “macro” dimensions of work organizations and inequality’. Tilly’s (1998) 
notion of ‘durable inequality’ elaborates on this view, providing a powerful argument for the 
central position of organisational structure in segmenting categorical distinctions, with 
inequality as the end result.  
Building partly on this work, a large body of recent studies has demonstrated the 
relevance of organisational-level perspectives on workplace inequality. Dobbin and 
colleagues (2006; 2011) have examined diversity initiatives in a wide range of American 
firms, exploring the effectiveness of different measures in creating equality of opportunity, 
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while Bielby (2008) points to the important role of formalisation and accountability structures 
in employment to reduce the scope of discrimination (see also Brief 2008; Tomaskovic-Devey 
& Stainback 2007). Indeed, the importance of recruitment procedures in preventing bias in 
hiring has received much attention. For example, Reskin (2000, 2008) argues that formalising 
employment processes may reduce the negative effects of cognitive bias against 
underprivileged groups, while Roscigno and colleagues (2007: 215) claim that employers 
activate potentially discriminatory criteria ‘only to the extent that organizational structures, 
procedures, and rules give them the flexibility to do so’. Moreover, Petersen and Saporta 
(2004) direct the attention to the ‘opportunity structure’ of discrimination, arguing that 
discrimination is most likely to occur at the point of initial hiring because this is where the 
chance of being ‘caught in the act’ is most limited (see also Bendick Jr & Nunes 2012: 242–
243). In the European context of immigration and ethnic diversity, Wrench (2007) has made 
similar arguments, claiming that the ideal of equality of opportunity can only be achieved in 
workplace contexts that have implemented bureaucratic structures of equal treatment at all 
levels in the organisation. 
Organisational-level theories of what causes discrimination offer important 
perspectives on the processes of workplace inequality. In the prevailing discrimination 
literature, however, discrimination is most often understood as reflections of individual 
motives or interpreted in terms of cognitive and psychological factors rather than as processes 
at the organisational and institutional levels (Bielby 2010). This is unfortunate, as 
organisations indeed mediate the biases of actors within organisations and the influence of 
broader societal processes (Pager & Shepherd 2008: 197). Bielby (2000: 124) makes this 
argument most clearly, stating that ‘the impact of gender and racial stereotyping on judgments 
about individuals can be minimized when judgments are based on timely and relevant 
information; when decision makers evaluate that information consistently with respect to 
clearly articulated criteria; and when a mechanism exists for holding decision makers 
accountable for the process they have used and criteria they have applied in making their 
judgments’. In practice, this means that insights from social psychological research on 
prejudice and stereotypes must be coupled with sociological research on the dynamics of 
organisations and institutions, providing analyses in which the organisational contexts of 
discrimination are moved to the forefront of this field of research. 
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Structural-level theories 
Theories of discrimination aim at explaining why members of a dominant majority group tend 
to exclude members of minority groups. Usually, these theories take as their point of 
departure the actions of individuals and how these actions are shaped by intrapsychic factors 
like attitudes or implicit biases against minority groups, sometimes including the 
organisational determinants of when attitudes and biases are translated into action. However, 
discriminatory hiring decisions are also shaped by broader social structures (Pager & 
Shepherd 2008: 197).  
 For example, both individual and organisational behaviour are, at least to a certain 
extent, influenced by the legal environment in a given context. There can be little doubt that 
anti-discrimination legislation, developed more or less simultaneously in the US and Britain 
in the early 1960s and later on transported to most European countries, has been important in 
institutionalising principles of equal treatment for racial and ethnic minorities.16 Despite 
similarities across countries, the impact of these laws on mechanisms of workplace 
discrimination depends on their formulation, implementation, and enforcement (Reskin 2003: 
11), and there are large variations across national contexts (e.g. Bleich 2011; Wrench 2007). 
The actual influences of legal requirements on individual actions and organisations’ 
willingness to implement procedural structures that constrain biases in recruitment will as 
such vary considerably between countries.  
 Ethnic relations are also influenced by social structures with longer historical roots. In 
the US, for example, the history of slavery and institutionalised racial segregation still impact 
structures of disadvantage particularly affecting the African-American population (e.g. 
Alexander 2010; Dixon 2006; Massey & Denton 1993; Pager & Shepherd 2008). In many 
European countries, like Britain, France, and the Netherlands, the longstanding history of 
imperialism and colonialism have shaped the dynamics of migration, illustrated by the fact 
that a substantial number of the immigrants that arrived to these countries in the post-war era 
came from former colonies (see Castles & Miller 2009: ch. 5). 
Many scholars argue that Europe’s colonial past also has bearing on contemporary 
patterns of racism, indicating that histories of exploitation directly affect ethnic relations 
through traditions, ideologies, and cultural practices that systematically deny ethnic minority 
groups full membership in the majority community (e.g. Andersson 2003; Bach & Solomos 
2000: part 4; Gilroy 1991, 2005; Goldberg 2006; Gullestad 2006; Kamali 2009). Others relate 
                                                          
16 See Dobbin (2011) for a historical account of the ‘invention’ of equal opportunity and the particular 
development of anti-discrimination legislation and affirmative action policies in the US.  
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racism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe to the economic and social consequences of 
the economic crisis in the 1970s and, later, to the renewed focus on security and global 
terrorism following September 11 2001, arguing that the combination of large-scale migration 
and a revival of nationalism and its symbols have created a situation that systematically works 
in disfavour of migrants generally, and the Muslim population in Western countries in 
particular (Castles & Miller 2009: 37–38; see also Moses 2006).  
 In any case, a major question concerns the relevance of structural-level theories in 
explaining individual action. Although discourses representing immigrants as inherently and 
culturally ‘different’ may lead to marginalisation and social exclusion at a societal level 
(Boréus 2006), it is unclear how and when these processes actually translate into, for example, 
actual hiring decisions. Perhaps the most important insight from these perspectives that can be 
applied to empirical discrimination research is that individuals and groups may suffer from 
discrimination without implying that the single perpetrator is an ‘old-fashioned’ racist – as 
often is assumed when discussing racism (Hagelund 2004; Jensen 1994). By taking into 
account that legacies of past discrimination and broader social processes of exclusion may 
shape structures of disadvantage without implying wilful acts of particular individuals, these 
perspectives offer crucial insights into the ways ethnic inequalities may be reproduced even in 
the absence of direct discrimination. 
 
Theoretical framework of the dissertation 
The extensive literature on ethnic and racial discrimination includes a wide range of theories 
explaining the formation, persistence, and reproduction of inequality, and the above-
mentioned perspectives by no means represent an exhaustive list. However, the narrower 
branch of field experiment studies of employment discrimination has almost exclusively dealt 
with the first set of individual-level explanations, usually revolving around the traditional 
distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination (e.g. Carlsson 2010; Gneezy, 
List, & Price 2012; Kaas & Manger 2012; List 2004), but at times also discussing the 
relevance of stereotypes and sociological notions of group positioning (e.g. Andriessen, 
Nievers, Dagevos, & Faulk 2012; Bursell 2012). 
Although field experiments have proved important in demonstrating that 
discrimination in the access to employment in fact occurs, this research tradition has not been 
equally productive in identifying the mechanisms leading to discrimination. As a result, it has 
not contributed particularly to advancing the theoretical understanding of why and under what 
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conditions racial visibility or an ethnically distinct name translates into discriminatory 
behaviour.17 An important reason for this omission is the tendency among most field 
experiment researchers to implicitly assume that discrimination may be explained by single 
causes, that is, what Reskin (2003: 4) has defined as an ‘assumption of within-group 
homogeneity on the causal variable’. Resting on individual-level explanations of explicit 
motives or stereotypes, most field experiments result in support for a single explanation or 
simply in recommendations for more research, as the single most decisive factor explaining 
the empirical findings cannot be directly inferred from a given study.  
By contrast, this dissertation is theoretically driven by the idea that although it is both 
relevant and interesting to explore the individual-level factors influencing hiring behaviour 
(indeed, the theoretical discussion in article III is merely concerned with theories at the micro-
level), there is no straightforward, easily interpretable relationship between employers’ 
general beliefs about or stereotypes against ethnic minorities and the acts of discrimination 
documented by a field experiment. Thus, in addition to individual-level theories, I draw on 
theories derived from organisational sociology, demonstrating how contextual factors, like the 
extent to which hiring decisions are based on managerial discretion or formalised recruitment 
procedures, influence the probability of discriminatory outcomes in recruitment processes 
above and beyond individual motives and cognitive biases.18  
Theories at the individual and organisational levels have proved most useful in making 
sense of the findings of this dissertation, implying that structural-level theories are less 
relevant in examining how and why particular employment processes resulted in 
discriminatory outcomes. This does not mean that, for example, public discourses 
representing ethnic minorities in negative ways are without relevance to the broader study of 
ethnic relations; neither does it imply that media representations of ethnic ‘others’ cannot 
affect employers’ attitudes or stereotypes. Processes of this kind, operating at a societal level 
but affecting individual perceptions of the social reality, may indeed be relevant for studies of 
discrimination and racism.  
However, although the experimental data demonstrates that discrimination is a 
problem in the Norwegian labour market, it also reveals large variations between the public 
and the private sector and across the occupational spectrum examined, indicating that there 
                                                          
17 Important exceptions to this general assessment can be found in the work of Devah Pager and colleagues (e.g. 
Pager & Quillian, 2005; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009), which I will return to in the review of field 
experiment research in the next section. 
18 These points are most clearly addressed in article IV of the dissertation, and I will return to their implications 
in the concluding section of this introduction. 
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are different processes of exclusion occurring at different locations in the labour market. 
Moreover, the employer interviews show that although immigrant stereotypes can explain 
why many employers are reluctant to hire individuals with foreign names (whether they are 
immigrants or not), they also suggest how certain employment contexts (e.g. when 
recruitment procedures are formalised) may prevent negative attitudes and stereotypes from 
being translated into discriminatory behaviour, while other contexts (e.g. hiring decisions 
based on discretionary first impressions) may lead to discrimination, despite the employers’ 
best intentions. These are mechanisms operating at the level of organisations, which cannot 
be satisfactorily explained by theories at either the individual or structural level. 
Organisational-level theories, on the other hand, are clearly relevant because they provide 
insights into the ways organisational characteristics mediate between individual action and 
broader social processes. 
In conclusion, the empirical findings of this dissertation highlight the need for 
exploring the conditions under which recruitment processes lead to discrimination, rather than 
operating with general theories assuming that structurally-based ethnic relations have direct 
effects on hiring decisions. Consequently, I rest my analyses most heavily on theories at the 
individual and organisational levels in an effort to specify the mechanisms linking the ethnic 
background attributed to job candidates to the particular outcome of employment processes. 
For this purpose, the multi-method research design has proved beneficial: By combining a 
direct measure of discrimination with a qualitative ‘tracing’ of hiring procedures and 
practices, the design allows for an empirical and context-sensitive approach that aims to 
identify mechanisms of discrimination in employment. In the next section, I elaborate on the 
details of this methodological approach as well as the notion of social mechanisms. 
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METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Field experiments have proved powerful in documenting the role of discrimination in shaping 
access to opportunity in a wide range of social domains. In this section, I present the field 
experiment methodology and briefly review the experimental research on employment 
discrimination. I then proceed to some examples in which field experiments have been 
complemented with other methods, demonstrating that combining field experiments with 
qualitative approaches represents a favourable strategy when aiming at identifying 
mechanisms of discrimination. Last, I discuss important epistemological challenges of 
conducting multi-method social research and reflect upon the bearing of these challenges for 
the present study.  
 
The field experiment methodology 
The strength of experimental approaches to studies of discrimination is the ability to isolate 
causal effects. In a randomised, controlled experiment, typically conducted in a laboratory 
setting, subjects are randomly assigned to clearly defined ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ conditions 
in order to control for every other factor potentially influencing the outcome of interest. 
However, a main concern with laboratory experiments is external validity: Because the 
research is conducted in artificial settings, it is difficult to assess whether results obtained in 
the laboratory may be generalised to the real world (Morton & Williams 2008: 344; Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell 2002: ch. 3; see also Cartwright 2005). Field experiments, by contrast, 
combine the strengths of experimental methods with field-based research, relaxing the control 
over environmental influences to meet the problems of external validity (Pager 2007b: 109). 
In field experiments, matching and randomising assignments allow researchers to retain the 
ability to draw causal inferences, while staging the research in real-world settings like hiring 
processes ensures that conclusions are relevant to actual social contexts (ibid.).19  
Field experiments of employment discrimination may be grouped into two main 
categories or techniques: audit studies and correspondence studies. In audit studies, pairs of 
individuals who differ in racial visibility but are carefully matched in relevant productivity 
characteristics and trained to act similarly, apply for real-world jobs by showing up in person 
                                                          
19 Conducting experiments in real-world contexts does, however, create challenges for the internal validity of 
these studies. Indeed, a long-lasting debate within this research tradition has concerned the accuracy of causal 
inference provided by field experiments (see Heckman 1998; Heckman & Siegelman 1993 for important critical 
perspectives). Because this debate is reviewed in article I (Midtbøen & Rogstad 2012a), I do not go further in 
examining problems of internal validity at this point.  
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(e.g. Pager 2003; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski 2009). In correspondence studies, as 
exemplified by this dissertation, matched pairs of résumés and cover letters differing in the 
names of the applicants (signalling different race or ethnicity) are sent in response to job 
openings (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004; Oreopoulos 2011). In both types of studies, 
the effect of race or ethnicity on employment opportunities is directly measured. Because all 
factors other than race or ethnicity are isolated and the résumés are randomly assigned to the 
test persons, well-conducted field experiments provide convincing estimates of the incidence 
of discrimination in specific labour markets (Quillian 2006: 303). 
 
The world of field experiment research 
The first field experiments were conducted in Britain and the US in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g. 
Daniel 1968; Jowell & Prescott-Clarke 1970; McIntosh & Smith 1974; Wienk, Reid, 
Simonson, & Eggers 1979). The timing was not coincidental: In both countries, the new civil 
rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in access to housing and employment abolished 
the most blatant examples of racial discrimination, for instance in job advertisements (Arrow 
1998). However, whether these overt forms of discrimination were indicative of a decrease in 
discrimination altogether or rather if prohibitions simply led to a change in expression was a 
question left unanswered. The field experiment method was introduced in an attempt to 
answer this question and has been a steady part of the methodological tool-kit for social 
scientists studying discrimination in Britain and the US ever since. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, only a few other countries utilised field experiments in 
assessing the extent of discrimination: The Netherlands and France (Bovenkerk, Kilbourne, 
Raveau, & Smith 1979), Canada (Henry & Ginzberg 1985), and Australia (Riach & Rich 
1987, 1991). In the beginning of the 1990s, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
initiated a large-scale comparative project involving field experiment research in several 
European countries (Bovenkerk 1992; Zegers de Beijl 1999), extending the approach to 
countries like Germany (Goldberg, Mourinho, & Kulke 1996), Belgium (Arrijn, Feld, & 
Nayer 1998), Spain (de Prada, Actis, & Pereda 1996), Denmark (Hjarnø & Jensen 1997), Italy 
(Allasino, Reyneri, Venturini, & Zincone 2004), and Sweden (Attström 2007). Today, field 
experiment studies of discrimination are flourishing. Most notably, the approach has gained 
interest in the European context,20 but recent field experiments have also been conducted in 
                                                          
20 Recent studies have been conducted in the Netherlands (Andriessen et al. 2012), Belgium (Baert, Cockx, 
Gheyle, Vandamme, & Omey 2012), Ireland (McGinnity & Lunn 2011), Sweden (Bursell 2012; Carlsson 2009), 
Greece (Drydakis & Vlassis 2010), Switzerland (Fibbi et al. 2006), France (Duguet, Leandri, L'Horty, & Petit 
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countries like India (Banarjee, Bertrand, Datta, & Mullainathan 2009; Thorat & Newman 
2009) and Chile (Bravo, Sanhueza, & Urzúa 2010), indicating that experimental approaches 
to discrimination research are considered relevant across the globe.21  
In sum, field experiments of employment discrimination have been conducted in 
dozens of countries for more than 40 years, demonstrating the prevalence of racial and ethnic 
discrimination in a wide range of institutional contexts (see reviews in Charles & Guryan 
2011; Fix & Struyk 1993; Levitt & List 2009; Pager 2007b; Riach & Rich 2002). Results 
have varied across countries, but not a single study has concluded that discrimination is not a 
relevant factor in shaping access to employment for a variety of racial and ethnic minority 
groups. In most studies, the probability of receiving a job offer or being invited to a job 
interview for minority applicants is reduced by between 20 and 50 per cent compared to 
equally qualified majority peers. In fact, no studies have concluded that the negative effect of 
minority status on employment opportunities is less than 15 per cent, although large and 
important differences in discrimination rates across the occupations included in a given field 
experiment are often reported (e.g. Carlsson & Rooth 2007) – and sometimes also between 
different ethnic groups (e.g. Booth et al. 2012). Despite these variations, the vast amount of 
field experiment research clearly demonstrates that discrimination continues to represent a 
significant barrier to the inclusion of minority groups in the labour market.  
 
Mechanisms of discrimination: Mixing field experiments with other methods 
No doubt, the beauty of a field experiment is the ability to assess the direct effect that race or 
an ethnically distinct name has on employment prospects, and the opportunity to generate 
strong causal inferences is probably an important explanation for the increased popularity of 
experimental methods in sociology (Pager 2007b), economics (List & Rasul 2010), and 
political science (Green & John 2010) in recent years. Still, a basic premise of the present 
study is that this methodological approach also has certain limitations. Although field 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2010), Germany (Kaas & Manger 2012), Spain (Albert, Escot, & Fernández-Corenjo 2011), and Britain (Wood, 
Hales, Purdon, Sejersen, & Hayllar 2009). 
21 To be sure, field experiments have not been limited to racial and ethnic discrimination in employment. 
Researchers have studied the extent of discrimination in, for example, access to housing (e.g. Andersson et al. 
2012; Drydakis 2011; Yinger 1986) and mortgage lending (Ladd 1998) and in bargaining for cars (Ayres & 
Siegelman 1995; List 2004). Furthermore, field experiments have been conducted to explore discriminatory 
practices on the basis of gender (e.g. Booth & Leigh 2010; Neumark, Bank, & Van Nort 1996; Riach & Rich 
1987, 2006b), religion (Widner & Chicoine 2011), caste (Siddique 2011; Thorat & Attewell 2007), sexual 
orientation (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt 2013; Drydakis 2012; Tilcsik 2011; Weichselbaumer 2003), 
social class (Jackson 2009), disability (Graham, Jordan, & Lamb 1990), age (e.g. Ahmed, Andersson, & 
Hammarstedt 2012; Lahey 2008; Riach & Rich 2006a, 2007), obesity (Rooth 2009), and criminal records (Pager 
2003; Pager, Western, & Bonikowski 2009).  
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experiments convincingly have documented the fact that discrimination occurs, this research 
tradition has been less productive in explaining the processes by which race and ethnicity 
become factors of importance in employers’ decision-making (Pager, Western, & Bonikowski 
2009: 786; see also Roscigno 2007: 13).  
This argument can be made more clearly by examining what type of causal study a 
field experiment in fact represents. The main goal of randomised, controlled experiments is to 
document the direct effect of some cause or intervention, in this case the effect of having a 
Pakistani name on the probability of receiving a job interview offer versus the probability of 
receiving a call-back for applicants with Norwegian names, everything else being equal. 
However, randomised experiments have their unique strength in providing causal 
descriptions, not causal explanations (Shadish et al. 2002: 9), and cannot, by themselves, 
satisfactorily explain how or why a particular outcome was produced (Holland 2003: 6; see 
also Cartwright & Hardie: part 4). This means that a field experiment can demonstrate the 
causal effect of a foreign name on employment prospects, but it cannot shed much light on the 
mechanisms leading to discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, the findings of field 
experiments have been claimed to explain racial differentials in income (Darity & Mason 
1998: 76) as well as to document the causes of discrimination (Yinger 1998: 36). As such, 
this research tradition has at times featured what Elster (2009) in another context has called 
‘excessive ambitions’; that is, field experiments have been used as a basis for more far-
reaching conclusions than can be inferred from their actual findings.22 
Still, there is little doubt that research that identifies the mechanisms explaining how 
and why discrimination affects labour market opportunities for disadvantaged groups would 
be most welcome. Indeed, the ‘plea’ for mechanisms (Elster 1998) has been quite loud among 
social scientists in recent years, not least through the influential programme of ‘analytical 
sociology’ (e.g. Hedström 2005; Hedström & Bearman 2009; Hedström & Swedberg 1998b). 
Analytical sociology aims at developing mechanism-based explanations of social phenomena, 
defined by Hedström and Swedberg (1998a: 10) as research that ‘do[es] not rest with 
describing the strength and the form of the relationship between the entities of interest but 
addresses a further and deeper problem: how (i.e., through what process) was the relationship 
brought about?’ As such, the ambition of analytical sociology is to move beyond descriptions 
                                                          
22 See article I (Midtbøen & Rogstad 2012a) for an elaboration of this point.  
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of statistical associations between variables by explaining social phenomena through 
specification of the social mechanisms generating the outcome of interest.23  
The ‘plea’ for mechanisms has also come from within the narrower field of 
discrimination research. In her presidential address to the American Sociological Association 
in 2002, Barbara Reskin (2003) argued that sociologists should pay more attention to the 
mechanisms leading to discrimination in employment. According to Reskin, theories of taste-
based and statistical discrimination, currently dominating the quantitative discrimination 
literature, cannot be tested empirically because they presuppose that the researcher has access 
to the motives of single actors. Mechanism-based theories of discrimination, by contrast, ask 
how discrimination takes place by exploring ‘the specific processes that link individual’s 
ascriptive characteristics to work place outcomes’ (Reskin 2003: 2). 
In an effort to come closer to the mechanisms of employment discrimination, a small 
subgroup within the field experiment literature complements field experiments with 
qualitative approaches. Pioneering in this regard are the series of field experiments conducted 
by Devah Pager in the 2000s, exploring the effects of race and criminal records on 
employment opportunities in the US. For example, in an audit study conducted in New York 
(Pager, Western, & Bonikowski 2009; Pager, Western, & Sugie 2009), the experimental data 
was supplemented with field notes written by the test persons after each encounter with 
employers. These field notes demonstrated not only that the ‘white’ and African-American 
applicants were treated highly differently, but that even when both received a job offer (i.e. 
situations otherwise registered as equal treatment in field experiments conducted in isolation), 
the latter were channelled into doing less favourable tasks compared to the equally qualified 
white applicants.24  
Another example of how qualitative approaches in combination with field experiments 
can broaden our understanding of the nature of discrimination stems from the interview data 
collected in this dissertation. The interviews suggested that the awareness of descendants of 
                                                          
23 Although the focus on social mechanisms has been rapidly increasing in the social sciences in recent years, a 
uniform definition of social mechanisms does not exist. Gerring (2007) identifies nine different meanings of the 
concept in contemporary social science, ranging from law-like explanations to particular techniques for analyses, 
pointing to the need for some kind of definitional consensus among researchers. His proposal is a minimum 
definition in which a social mechanism is equal to ‘the pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a 
purpose is accomplished’ (Gerring 2007: 178). In this definition, a mechanism represents the link between a 
cause and an outcome, thus implying that it is not enough to simply establish the existence of a causal 
relationship, but to explain both how and why a particular outcome was produced. 
24 Except for Pager’s work (see also Pager 2003; Pager & Quillian 2005), only a few other field experiments 
have been complemented by other methods. Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Oreopoulos (2011) have combined 
correspondence studies and telephone surveys with employers, while Rooth and Agerström (2009) have 
combined a field experiment with an Implicit Association Test. 
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immigrants as prospective job applicants is scarcely distributed among Norwegian employers. 
Instead, a foreign name tends to be equated with the immigrant experience, resulting in 
rejections of minority applicants with reference to, for example, an assumed lack of language 
proficiency, even though the applicants were young, the cover letters were written in fluent 
Norwegian, and the résumés clearly stated that all schooling and higher education was 
attained in Norwegian educational institutions. This finding enabled a theoretical exploration 
of the role of stereotypes in employers’ decision-making (see article III), which data from a 
single field experiment would not have led to.  
These examples show the promise of integrating field experiments with qualitative 
methods because the combination of methods allows for a closer examination of the 
mechanisms of discrimination. Indeed, studies of mechanisms would normally require some 
kind of ethnographic account, as neither experiments nor quantitative analyses of large 
datasets provide much information of how an effect was brought about (Paluck 2010). 
Nevertheless, the analytical sociology approach to social research does not seem to include 
any role for qualitative inquiries. Sørensen (1998: 238), for example, claims that qualitative 
approaches cannot provide data that are sufficiently reliable or generalisable to satisfy 
requirements for scientific theories, and in Hedström’s (2005) introduction to analytical 
sociology the idea that qualitative approaches may offer insights that other methods cannot is 
rejected. Still, the empirical example of how the framework of analytical sociology may be 
used in practical research (Hedström 2005: ch. 6) – an analysis of the social dynamics of 
unemployment among young individuals in Stockholm in the 1990s – partly rests on 
qualitative interviews with youth conducted before the quantitative analysis is even started 
(Hedström 2005: 122), and these accounts shape the interpretation of the quantitative 
material. This is an illustrative example of the benefits of combining qualitative research with 
statistical analyses and agent-based modelling. Yet despite the fact that the insights gained 
from the interviews actually guide Hedström throughout his argument, the advantages of 
qualitative methods when searching for social mechanisms are left unmentioned. 
 
A multi-method research design 
As would be clear by now, this dissertation takes as its point of departure that a complex 
phenomenon like discrimination in employment is best studied by combining data collected 
through the use of different methods. However, there is a variety of ways in which different 
data types can be mixed, and studies of this kind can be categorised by three main 
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dimensions: the motivations to combine different types of data, the extent of sequencing in the 
data collection, and the level of nesting of the different data sources (Small 2011: 63). 
In terms of motivations for combining data sources, multi-method studies may be 
conducted either by a wish to confirm or verify the findings derived from one type of data by 
the findings from another type, or by the complementarity of different data, indicating that 
one type compensates for the limitations of another. Second, studies combining different data 
may be catalogued by the extent of sequencing of the data collection. In concurrent designs, 
several types of data are collected simultaneously, while in sequential designs one type of data 
precedes another for methodological reasons. Finally, multi-data studies may be grouped by 
the level of nesting of the different data sources. Nested research designs use data that are 
collected from the same actors, organisations, or entities (see Lieberman 2005) – typically by 
conducting a large-N survey and then drawing a sub-sample of these respondents for 
subsequent in-depth interviews – while non-nested designs use data from different units of 
analysis. The three dimensions are summarised in table 1.  
 
Table 1 Dimensions of mixed-data collection in multi-method social science25 
 
Motivation 
 
 
The extent of sequencing   
 
The level of nesting 
 
Confirmation  
 
Complementarity 
 
Concurrent 
 
Sequenced  
 
Same units 
 
Different units 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, a field experiment is complemented by in-depth interviews with 
employers. As such, I combine two different data types, experimental data and interview data, 
collected by using two different methods, a correspondence study and qualitative interviews. 
Using the three dimensions in table 1, this particular study is, first, motivated by the 
complementarity of different methods. The field experiment has the advantage of assessing 
the causal effect of a Pakistani name on the probability of receiving a job interview offer. 
Furthermore, interviewing a subsample of the employers participating in the experiment 
provides an opportunity to explore the various reasons why employers act as they do and the 
contexts surrounding their hiring decisions. Although qualitative data always are at risk of 
selection effects and social desirability bias and suffer from problems of representativeness, 
previous studies of discrimination based on employer interviews in the US demonstrate that 
                                                          
25 This table summarises the three main dimensions of mixed-data collection, described in a recent, 
comprehensive review of multi-method social science (Small 2011: 63–71).  
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this approach offers a possibility to gather comprehensive information on employer attitudes 
and beliefs (e.g. Kirschenman & Neckerman 1991; Moss & Tilly 2001, 2006; Pager & 
Karafin 2009). Complementing the correspondence study with a qualitative approach thus 
allows for assessing a broader set of causal questions than can field experiments conducted in 
isolation.  
Second, the study has a clear-cut sequential research design. The data was collected in 
two different phases. In the first phase, the field experiment was conducted by sending 
hundreds of paired, fictitious résumés and application letters to real-world job openings. As 
soon as one or both of the fictitious applicants were contacted by an employer, the outcome of 
the test was carefully registered and the job offers politely refused. In the second phase, a 
selection of employers who had invited one or both of the applicants to a job interview 
received a letter informing them about the study and that a given hiring process had been 
subject to observation, and finally inviting them to be interviewed about recruitment in the 
Norwegian labour market. Because the employer interviews were intended to shed light on a 
selection of the hiring decisions observed through the experiment, a sequential research 
design was necessary.  
Third, the qualitative data are nested in the large-N experiment in the sense that the 
sample of employers participating in the qualitative part of the study was drawn from the pool 
of employers whose hiring practices were observed in the field experiment. However, this 
study does not follow the schematic characteristics of a nested analysis of multi-method data 
as described by Lieberman (2005: 437), in which small-N analyses are used to either test or 
build models based on a preliminary large-N analysis. The concept of ‘nesting’ in this 
particular study simply means that the respondents in the interview phase of the study were 
selected from the population of employers constituted by participation in the field experiment.  
As the articles in this dissertation in various ways discuss the research design (articles 
I, II, III, and IV), the process of implementing the field experiment (articles II and IV), the 
relationship between the experiment and the interviews (articles I, III and IV), and potential 
sources of bias in the qualitative material (articles III and IV), this introduction does not delve 
further into the methodological details of the study. Instead, I use the remainder of the section 
to briefly review a major debate concerning the epistemological perspectives underpinning 
different methodological techniques and to situate the multi-method research design of the 
present study within this literature.  
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Multi-method social research: An epistemological contradiction in terms? 
Multi-method research designs have increasingly gained popularity in the social sciences in 
recent years (e.g., Bryman 2007; Creswell & Plano Clarck 2011; Small 2011). As every 
single-method approach to social science has limitations regarding either its generalisability 
or depth, combining several methods has the potential of bringing research closer, deeper, and 
more widely into the anatomy of social life. However, a commonly held view among many 
social scientists is that multi-method research also faces particular challenges. An important 
point of discussion is whether combining quantitative and qualitative approaches represents 
an epistemological contradiction in terms because the different methods reflect different 
assumptions about the nature of truth, or if qualitative approaches in fact (though often not 
acknowledged) share with quantitative methods an underlying notion of causation (Seawright 
forthcoming).  
 The distinction between statistical analyses of large datasets, on the one hand, and 
qualitative analysis of a small number of cases, on the other, is the typical point of departure 
when debating multi-method social science. According to Ahmed and Sil (2009: 3), 
quantitative and qualitative methods rest on ‘incommensurable epistemological foundations 
that even the most heroic attempts of translation cannot overcome’. Others, like George and 
Bennet (2004: 6), claim instead that ‘case studies share a similar epistemological logic with 
statistical methods and with formal modelling that is coupled with empirical research’ and 
that the main point of divergence lies in the different methodological logics they represent 
(see Brady & Collier 2004 for a similar view).  
Combining a field experiment with in-depth employer interviews entails an even 
greater epistemological contrast than the more conventional quantitative/qualitative divide. 
The experimental method originated from the developments in disciplines like chemistry and 
physics in the seventeenth century (Shadish et al. 2002: 2) and when social scientists use 
randomised, controlled experiments they also adapt (at least implicitly) the key explanatory 
logic of the experimental method, implying a sense of ‘methods community’ between the 
social and the natural sciences (Mjøset 2009: 42). Qualitative, case-based approaches in the 
social sciences have, on the other hand, developed historically in direct opposition to such 
ideas. By focusing on the symbolic dimension of meaning, inspired by the work of Weber and 
Schütz, the philosophical foundation of qualitative social science is based on a critique of 
‘positivism’, insisting instead on the subjective character of human action and that social life 
cannot be reduced to law-like regularities (Mjøset 1991: 174–175). In fact, as Mjøset (2009: 
47) argues, case studies can be depicted as the opposite of the experiment: ‘In an experiment, 
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the production of a predicted outcome is just a means to arrive at general statements on the 
process. In case studies, outcome and process are significant in and of themselves’. Thus, in 
terms of historical development, philosophical orientation, and the practical craft of 
conducting empirical social research, the combination of methods used in this dissertation 
may seem problematic from an epistemological point of view. 
However, a more pragmatic approach may also be adopted. Although it is clearly the 
case that experiments and case studies have different philosophical origins and often will have 
divergent objectives for social research, their views of the social world are not necessarily 
incompatible and a combination of the two does not inevitably lead to an epistemological 
conflict (Hammersley 2008). Rather, as different methods provide different information on 
what is studied, the disadvantages of one approach may be compensated by the advantages of 
the other, and vice versa. Qualitative measurement within a field experiment can, for example, 
lead to a better understanding of the causal effect, suggest plausible causal explanations, and 
uncover processes of human action that are otherwise invisible (Paluck 2010: 61). This point 
of view does not imply that field experiments and qualitative approaches have identical 
epistemological perspectives or that case studies are analogue to experiments, as some 
scholars have suggested (e.g. Andersen 2013; Yin 1984). Instead, it highlights that 
complementary knowledge of a shared social world may be derived from data collected by 
different methods. The virtue of employing a field experiment in this study is its ability to 
assess the causal effect of a foreign name on hiring opportunities. Qualitative employer 
interviews, on the other hand, provide insights into the processes by which the ethnic 
background of job applicants in some contexts leads to discriminatory hiring practices. As 
such, combining experimental and qualitative approaches may lead to a broader 
understanding of the nature of discrimination than could be inferred by either method 
conducted in isolation.  
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THE ETHICS OF FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
 
The final aspect of the research design that will be discussed in this introductory chapter 
concerns the ethics of field experiments. A fundamental principle in social research states that 
those subjected to research shall have the opportunity to provide a free and informed consent, 
assuring that research participation is voluntary and that the decision is based on sufficient 
information. In practice, participating in research is not always entirely voluntary and 
informed consent is not always particularly informed. However, it is less usual that 
researchers actively violate the principle of informed consent and subject to research people 
who have not received any information about their participation, as is the case with field 
experiments. May ‘deceptive’ methods still be justified within the logic of research ethics? 
 
An unethical approach to social research? 
In their nature, field experiments represent a break with the principle of informed consent 
(Pager 2007a: 76–78; Riach & Rich 2004). Testing for employment discrimination, the 
method requires that employers unwittingly are recruited for participation and that they are 
subjected to fictitious résumés or test persons acting as real job candidates. As mentioned in 
the methodology section, the approach was developed to explore the relevance of 
discrimination in hiring after the most blatant examples of such practices had disappeared. To 
examine recruitment practices implies that employers cannot be aware that they are under 
observation. Thus, both deception and absence of informed consent are intrinsic parts of field 
experiments.  
Using field experiments in the study of discrimination represents a dilemma. On the 
one hand, social researchers should obey the principle of informed consent because violating 
this norm raises questions related to individual freedom, independence, and privacy, as well 
as potentially putting the scientific integrity of the research community at risk (NESH 2006). 
On the other hand, it is not possible to directly observe discriminatory hiring practices by 
using non-experimental methods, and refraining from using a method that enables the direct 
measurement of discrimination also has problematic aspects. As Banton (1997: 419) points 
out, ‘[t]o conclude that the ethical objections to practice-testing [i.e. field experiments] 
constitute an insuperable obstacle to the use of this research method is, in effect, to endorse 
the prevailing incidence of racial discrimination’. Approaching this dilemma, the problems of 
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field experiments – particularly the burdens on employers – must be considered in close 
relation to the potential benefits of conducting studies of this kind.   
Discussing the consequences of field experiment research for individual employers, 
Bovenkerk (1992: 33–34) argues that the principle of informed consent may be deferred for 
three main reasons: First, the right to privacy is not decisive because the act of ‘hiring 
personnel is not an entirely private matter’. Employers are not entitled to exclude job 
candidates on the grounds of their ethnic background; hence, their hiring decisions have 
public interest and could be studied by social researchers.  
Second, field experiments have almost no harmful effects on individual employers. 
This method is used to explore whether stigmatised groups on average face disadvantages in 
the access to occupational positions, and in this context, harming individual employers by 
revealing their identities or holding them liable for discrimination is simply not of interest. As 
previously mentioned, field experiments conducted for research purposes are in fact not even 
useful as tests for litigation because the single act of inviting one out of two equally qualified 
applicants to a job interview could be the result of a coincidence (Pager & Western 2012). 
Third, although a field experiment makes employers consider résumés and cover 
letters that would otherwise not be among the applicants for a vacant position, the 
experimental situation is created within a recruitment process that has already been initiated 
by the employers themselves. Thus, employers are never ‘enticed to deviate from their normal 
course of action’ (Bovenkerk 1992: 34). Because field experiments are conducted within the 
context of real-life recruitment processes, the situations observed reflect conventional 
employment practices, making the problem of external validity less prominent and the 
problem of research ethics less decisive. 
There are indeed many arguments for conducting research on discrimination by using 
field experiments. Employers remain anonymous, hiring processes are of public interest, and 
employers are obliged to follow principles of equal treatment in recruitment (see also Rogstad 
1996). In terms of the reputation of social research in the wider public, however, the use of 
‘deceptive’ methods may clearly be negative. On the other hand, whether the scientific 
integrity of the research community will be hurt by studies of this type will depend heavily on 
the way the findings are communicated to the public. Discrimination is a topic of controversy 
in most countries, and research on exclusionary hiring practices will inevitably be conceived 
of as problematic by many actors. At the same time, as Pager (2007a: 78) argues, ‘[r]igorous 
and realistic measurement of discrimination is fundamental to understanding and addressing 
persistent barriers to employment facing members of stigmatized groups’. Complementing a 
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field experiment with employer interviews, moreover, allows for identifying mechanisms of 
discrimination, potentially providing an even stronger basis for the development of preventive 
social policies and anti-discrimination legislation (Midtbøen & Rogstad 2008). In this 
perspective, field experiment research may in fact strengthen the integrity of social research 
by providing new and important knowledge of the exclusionary dynamics of labour markets 
and by pointing out a direction for how this problem may be addressed.  
 
The history of approval 
In Norway, all researchers conducting projects that involve information on the individual or 
firm level must apply to the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD) for approval. In 
projects that are particularly challenging in terms of research ethics, researchers may also seek 
guidance from the National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the 
Humanities (NESH), which – in addition to drawing up guidelines for research ethics in the 
social sciences, law, humanities, and theology (NESH 2006) – contributes by evaluating 
particular projects when researchers want to safeguard their ethical considerations.  
 In the case of this research project, the ethical aspects were thoroughly considered. In 
fact, the process of considering the research ethics has a peculiar history that goes back to the 
early 1990s. When the International Labour Organization (ILO) launched the previously 
mentioned comparative project involving a series of field experiments to be conducted 
simultaneously in a wide range of countries,26 research ethics was a decisive argument against 
participation in one country: Sweden. When applying to the Swedish Council for Social 
Research for financial support to join the ILO project in 1993, two university researchers had 
their applications denied on the grounds of research ethics and particularly with reference to 
the principle of informed consent (Banton 1997: 415). This decision also had consequences 
outside the Swedish context: Because the method was rejected by the Swedish Council for 
Social Research it was assumed that the Research Council of Norway would reach the same 
conclusion. This is a main reason why Norwegian researchers during the 1990s never even 
applied for funding of experimental studies of discrimination (Rogstad 1996).  
Interestingly, this picture changed in the early 2000s. Sweden eventually joined the 
ILO project (Attström 2007), and since then a range of field experiments have been conducted 
in the Swedish context (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2012; Ahmed et al. 2013; Bursell 2012; Carlsson 
                                                          
26 These countries were Australia, Canada, the US, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Sweden.  
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2009; Carlsson & Rooth 2012). The fact that Swedish research ethics authorities changed 
their opinion of this method also led to an application for financial support of a field 
experiment on ethnic discrimination in the Norwegian labour market, resulting in a publically 
available report presenting the empirical findings of the study (Midtbøen & Rogstad 2012b) 
as well as in this doctoral dissertation. Nevertheless, a precondition for financial support was 
that the project was considered and ultimately approved by NESH in Norway.27  
In September 2008, a brief outline of the research design, along with a formal request 
to have the ethical aspects of the project evaluated, was sent to NESH for consideration. In 
their first reply, dated 15 December 2008, the committee stated that the project is important 
but that it would require a thorough evaluation based on more information followed by a 
subsequent discussion. Thus, a report (Rogstad & Midtbøen 2009) discussing the ethical 
aspects of the project more broadly was written during the fall of 2008 and a meeting was 
initiated.  
On 2 March 2009, the report was the subject for discussion at a meeting with NESH, 
and on 19 March the committee’s final statement was published. In this statement, NESH 
argues that despite the ethical problems related to field experiments and the specific research 
design, the project could be carried out conditioned on three prerequisites. First, the tests 
should be finalised at an early stage of the hiring process (implying that a correspondence 
study rather than an audit study was to be carried out). Second, no personal information about 
the specific individuals responsible for the hiring processes was to be registered. Third, to 
participate in the follow-up interviews the employers themselves had to respond to a written 
invitation, providing informed consent in the second part of the study. By meeting these 
conditions, according to NESH, the potential societal value of the research findings would 
exceed the ethical problems related to field experiment research. 
 
Ethics in practice 
Carefully considering the ethical implications of social research prior to its execution is an 
important part of every research project. However, it is equally important to comply with 
norms of research ethics throughout the process of implementation. In this project, the 
conditions made by NESH were closely followed. For example, no personal information 
                                                          
27 That is, NESH does not ‘approve’ or ‘reject’ research projects, but gives advice and assistance in making 
ethical considerations. In this case, however, the Ministry of Children, Equality, and Social Inclusion would not 
fund this research without a positive evaluation from NESH. This way, the committee’s decision in fact was 
equivalent to an approval, although the project ultimately could have been rejected by the Norwegian Data 
Protection Authority (Datatilsynet).  
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about the individuals responsible for hiring was registered electronically. Although the names 
of the persons responsible for recruitment were included on the job advertisements that were 
printed out for the sake of systematisation, the information was kept confidential by 
immediately cataloguing and locking down each advertisement after printing. By keeping the 
anonymity of individual employers and firms secured throughout the entire process, the 
burdens imposed on employers by the field experiment were exclusively constituted by the 
fact that each of them had to evaluate two fictitious job applicants that would otherwise not 
have been under consideration.  
A less clear-cut part of implementing this research, also of relevance for research 
ethics, was related to the qualitative interviews. On the one hand, conducting these interviews 
would give a sample of the employers subjected to research in the field experiment a rare 
opportunity to make sense of the particular outcome of the ‘test’ they had been exposed to. On 
the other hand, employers who had invited for a job interview only the majority candidate 
could potentially perceive the interview situation as an offense and feel obliged to defend or 
justify the decision made. As such, the qualitative part of the study represented a challenge 
methodologically, because undertaking interviews on the basis of tests of discrimination 
indeed is unusual. Moreover, the interviews were also a potential challenge to research ethics 
because the respondents could experience the interview situation as uncomfortable. 
To minimise the burden of participating in the qualitative part of the study, none of the 
employers, no matter the outcome of the ‘test’, were confronted with the results in an 
inappropriate way. Instead, each employer was given the choice of knowing the results of 
their decision. Furthermore, they were never accused of having made the ‘wrong’ decision, 
but were politely asked to reflect on the outcome on the basis of a sincere interest in their 
reflections. Interestingly, all of the employers wanted to know the outcome of their own test. 
A few of them clearly found this information unpleasant (situations that were ameliorated by 
quickly moving on to another topic), but the vast majority had no problems in accepting the 
premises of the conversation or in discussing topics that are undoubtedly quite sensitive. In 
fact, several of the employers explicitly stated that they were sympathetic to the idea of 
conducting experiments of employment discrimination and were happy to be given an 
opportunity to provide their view on the causes of discrimination in hiring. These reactions 
indicate that field experiments on discrimination may not be as controversial as one might 
expect. On the contrary, studying the occurrence of discriminatory hiring practices could even 
raise the awareness of the problem of discrimination among employers, potentially increasing 
their efforts to secure just treatment of job applicants regardless of ethnic background. 
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SUMMARY OF ARTICLES 
 
This dissertation consists of four scholarly articles. Article I, co-authored with Jon Rogstad, 
reviews important methodological debates in the field experiment literature and presents the 
multi-method research design of this particular study. The remaining three articles, of which I 
am the sole author, present the empirical findings and their theoretical implications. Article II 
discusses the broad results from the field experiment and relates the findings to experiments 
conducted in other contexts as well as to the on-going debate about the disadvantages facing 
descendants of immigrants in Europe. Article III is primarily based on the qualitative 
employer interviews and explores the role of ethnic stereotypes in determining discrimination 
in hiring. Finally, in article IV, the experimental and qualitative material is brought together in 
an analysis of the context of employment discrimination. 
 
Article I: Discrimination: Methodological controversies and sociological 
perspectives on future research 
Co-authored with Jon Rogstad (equal authorship) and published in Nordic Journal of 
Migration Research, 2012, 2(3): 203–212 
 
The article reviews the field experiment tradition of discrimination research. It presents the 
origins of this methodological approach and highlights its main characteristics. Furthermore, 
it discusses an important critique originating from the work of James Heckman (1998; 1993), 
concerning the existence of unobservable variables and the subsequent danger of drawing 
inferences on a wrong basis. The multi-method research design of this dissertation is 
introduced as a relevant answer to several of the questions raised about field experiment 
studies of discrimination. By supplementing a correspondence test study with in-depth 
interviews with employers who were subjected to the fictitious job applicants in the 
experiment, the design offers an opportunity to measure the extent of discrimination in the 
labour market while at the same time exploring the mechanisms involved in discriminatory 
hiring practices. Thus, it is argued that this particular research design has several advantages 
when compared to single-method approaches to the study of employment discrimination, 
providing a substantial understanding of the processes leading to ethnic inequality in the 
labour market. 
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Article II: Discrimination of the second generation: Evidence from a field 
experiment in Norway 
Under review  
 
The article presents and discusses the findings from the field experiment. By utilising a 
correspondence test study in which pairs of equivalent résumés and cover letters were sent in 
response to 900 job openings in the greater Oslo area, it explores the extent to which children 
of Pakistani immigrants experience employment discrimination. The results show that 
applicants with Norwegian names on average are 25 per cent more likely to receive a call 
back for a job interview than equally qualified applicants with Pakistani names. More refined 
analyses demonstrate that the effect of ethnic background on employment probabilities is 
larger among men than women and larger in the private sector than in the public sector, and 
important variations among the occupations included in the study are revealed. In an effort to 
separate the potentially conflating effects of gender and sector, all applications to gender-
segregated occupations were removed from the analyses. Interestingly, the gender differences 
disappear when exclusively analysing discrimination in gender-integrated occupations by 
sector. In gender-integrated occupations in the private sector, the gender difference in fact is 
reversed, indicating that women with minority background are treated less favourably than are 
minority men in the private sector. These results suggest that the intersection of gender, 
ethnicity, and sector should be scrutinised more carefully in future field experiments. 
 
Article III: The invisible second generation? Statistical discrimination and 
immigrant stereotypes in employment processes in Norway 
Accepted for publication in Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies  
 
The article takes the field experiment as a point of departure and uses the data from the in-
depth employer interviews to explore the decision-making processes leading to the 
disadvantages observed. Theoretically, the notion of statistical discrimination, frequently used 
as a main explanation for ethnic inequality in economics and quantitative sociology, is 
discussed in relation to social-psychological theories of prejudice and stereotypes. The 
qualitative material suggests that employers use ethnically distinct names as proxies for 
foreign education and lack of language proficiency – that is, stereotypes regularly associated 
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with the immigrant experience. The implications for the employment opportunities of children 
of immigrants are discussed. Instead of experiencing equal access to the labour market, they 
encounter attitudes and stereotypes attached to their parents’ generation, making their 
domestic educational qualifications and linguistic fluency ‘invisible’ in the eyes of employers. 
 
Article IV: The context of employment discrimination: Interpreting the findings 
of a field experiment 
Accepted for publication in British Journal of Sociology 
 
The article presents the key results from the field experiment and complements these findings 
with data from the qualitative employer interviews. The theoretical point of departure is that 
although field experiments have proved important in documenting the relevance of 
discrimination in employment, theories developed to explain the dynamics of differential 
treatment cannot account for differences across organisational and institutional contexts. 
Mixing a field experiment with in-depth interviews is introduced as a relevant approach for 
addressing this shortcoming. While the experimental data support earlier findings in 
documenting that ethnic discrimination in the labour market indeed takes place, the qualitative 
material suggests that theorising in the field experiment literature has been too concerned with 
individual-level explanations. Discriminatory outcomes in employment processes seem to 
depend on contextual factors such as the number of applications received, whether 
requirements are specified, and the degree to which recruitment procedures are formalised. In 
conclusion, it is argued that different contexts of employment provide different opportunity 
structures for discrimination, a finding with important theoretical and methodological 
implications.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this concluding section, I sum up the main findings of the dissertation by answering the two 
research questions guiding this work. I also highlight important remaining lacunas in our 
knowledge about employment discrimination of descendants of immigrants for future 
research to fill. At the very end, I reflect upon the relevance of this work for the further 
development of social policy and anti-discrimination legislation in Norway. 
 
Do descendants of immigrants in Norway experience employment 
discrimination? 
This dissertation takes as its point of departure that the role of discrimination in determining 
labour market outcomes of children of immigrants is notoriously difficult to assess. Although 
the second generation on average has demonstrated impressive results in education in 
Norway, as well as in a range of other European countries, a number of traditional 
quantitative studies have documented that descendants of immigrants – particularly of non-
European origin – seem to experience disadvantages in access to employment (see a review of 
this research in Heath et al. 2008). Still, these studies cannot rule out alternative explanations 
for the disadvantages observed, for example that differences in access to social networks may 
explain ethnic disparities in employment, leaving the role of discrimination somewhat 
unclear.  
 By conducting a field experiment, this dissertation documents that discrimination 
indeed is a relevant factor shaping employment prospects for descendants of immigrants in 
Norway. On average, the applicants with Pakistani names, compared to those with Norwegian 
names, had a 25 per cent lower probability of receiving a job interview offer. This result 
complements the findings from previous quantitative studies in Norway (Evensen 2009; 
Hermansen 2013), clearly demonstrating that discrimination at the entrance to the labour 
market does account for important barriers facing the second generation. 
 As has been emphasised several times throughout this introduction, generalisations on 
the basis of findings from field experiments must be made with caution. This study sheds light 
on the barriers facing young individuals with Pakistani names in the particular Norwegian 
context and cannot easily be transferred to other groups or compared to other countries. 
Because individuals of Pakistani origin make up about one third of the second generation in 
Norway and constitute the group which is oldest and as such has the most experience with the 
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Norwegian labour market, it seems fair to say that the results of the field experiment have 
important bearing for the employment prospects of descendants of non-European immigrants. 
Still, a Pakistani name may, for example, signal a general Muslim background rather than a 
specific ethnic group. In that case, what is measured is reluctance among Norwegian 
employers to hire applicants assumed to be Muslims, indicating that the findings cannot be 
translated to the second generation as a whole. 
Field experiments conducted in other European countries sometimes report large 
differences in discrimination rates among different ethnic groups (e.g. Booth et al. 2012; Fibbi 
et al. 2006). In other cases, no such difference is found – most notably in an Irish field 
experiment in which applicants with foreign names were 50 per cent less likely to receive job 
interview offers compared to applicants with Irish names, but with no significant differences 
between applicants with African, Asian, and German names (McGinnity & Lunn 2011). 
Because the present study has measured discrimination of only one minority group, I cannot 
assess if children of Pakistani immigrants are subjected to particularly high levels of 
discrimination, or rather if it is simply a foreign name – regardless of ethnic or religious 
affiliation – which creates the barrier to employment in Norway. Closer examination of the 
existence of ethnic hierarchies in employers’ hiring practices is one important task for future 
field experiment research. 
 While measuring discrimination rates among just one or a few minority groups limits 
the ability to generalise from the field experiment, the results are also difficult to compare 
because they are conducted within a specific national context. Countries differ in terms of the 
size and composition of the immigrant populations, legal systems, policy efforts of reducing 
discrimination, the structuring of labour markets, and the general economic situation. 
Although the overall discrimination rate reported from this field experiment is relatively low 
in international comparison (cf. the methodology section), the experiment was conducted 
during a time period characterised by a quite favourable economic situation in Norway. The 
global financial crisis of 2007–2008 did not affect Norway as acutely as most other European 
countries, and although there was a rise in unemployment rates during these years, 
particularly for certain immigrant groups, the situation was improving when the experiment 
was conducted. Of course, the financial crisis may still have led to uncertainty among 
employers, which again may have increased the level of discrimination. Still, the general 
unemployment rate in Norway at the time was remarkably low (cf. Figure 2). As there are 
reasons to believe that the level of discrimination rises when the demand for labour is low, 
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this indicates that the discrimination rate reported cannot be compared directly to field 
experiments conducted in countries experiencing less favourable economic situations.  
 Another reason why direct international comparison of field experiment research is 
difficult relates to the major differences between studies in terms of methodological rigour 
and the technique of measurement, as well as differences in the occupations included in the 
sample, whether applications were sent in response to job openings in both the public and the 
private sectors, and whether the gender of applicants was included as a factor of interest. In 
this study, both a female and a male pair of fictitious résumés and cover letters were sent in 
response to a range of different job openings representing a variety of occupations in both the 
private and the public sectors. Indeed, the experimental findings suggest that there is more 
discrimination against men with minority backgrounds than against minority women, more 
discrimination in the private sector than in the public sector, and large differences across the 
occupational spectrum. These results clearly point to the need for caution in drawing 
international comparisons unless a careful examination of the specific design is conducted, 
because differences in design may be conflated with differences in substantive results across 
national contexts.  
 This being said, the results from the experiment in the present study are nonetheless 
interesting in an international perspective. For example, several field experiments in Europe 
have reported that minority men are more exposed to employment discrimination than are 
minority women (e.g. Andriessen et al. 2012; Bursell 2012). At first glance, the results of this 
study support these findings. However, because the fictitious résumés and cover letters from 
the male pair of applicants often were sent in response to job openings in male-dominated 
occupations in the private sector, while the female pair mainly applied to female-dominated 
occupations in the public sector, the relative effects of gender, sector, and occupation on the 
overall results are intertwined. Analysing only gender-integrated occupations, to which both 
the male and the female applicant pairs applied, clearly reduces the gender difference, and 
when separating the results for gender-integrated occupations by sector, the gender difference 
disappears or is even reversed: In the public sector, the effect of ethnic background on call-
back rates is small and non-significant, and no gender difference exists. In gender-integrated 
occupations in the private sector, the negative effect of a Pakistani name on call-back rates is 
large and statistically significant, and women with a minority background are treated less 
favourably than are minority men. As previous field experiments reporting large gender 
differences have not explored the relevance of sector in their analyses, future studies should 
address the intersection of gender, ethnicity, and sector more carefully.  
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 The striking sector differences are also interesting because the public sector in Norway 
is large compared to most European countries – about 35 per cent of the total work force is 
employed in public companies – and it is well known for the relatively high levels of formal 
education required for permanent employment (Statistics Norway 2009a). Because the 
fictitious job candidates used in this experiment were always given the qualifications required, 
the small and non-significant call-back gaps in applications to public positions indicate that 
the public sector may serve as an important employment arena for the second generation in 
the years to come. Furthermore, it serves as a reminder that the size of the public sector may 
prove important in determining the level of discrimination experienced by children of 
immigrants in different countries, again highlighting the relevance of ‘controlling’ for sector 
differences when comparing discrimination rates across contexts.  
In sum, the field experiment demonstrates the relevance of discrimination in shaping 
access to employment for a large fraction of Norway’s second generation. Still, more research 
is needed to clarify whether discrimination rates vary between different ethnic groups, 
between men and women with minority backgrounds, and between the public and private 
sectors. It would also be relevant for European research on discrimination to catch up with 
recent research trends in the US, for example by exploring the ways in which race and ethnic 
background interact with other social markers, like criminal records (e.g. Pager 2003; Pager 
Western, & Bonikowski 2009) or sexual orientation (e.g. Pedulla 2012). Moreover, 
considering the differences in educational systems, labour market regulations, and welfare 
state arrangements in European countries, a question of increasing concern is the extent to 
which institutional contexts influence the trajectories of incorporation characterising the 
second generation (e.g. Crul & Mollenkopf 2012; Crul et al. 2012; Heath et al. 2008). Future 
studies should conduct carefully designed multi-sited field experiments that compare groups 
in similar labour market positions across a range of different countries in an effort to explore 
more directly the effect that national contexts have on discrimination rates.   
 
How, when, and why does ethnicity come to matter in employment processes?  
Although it is of unquestionable importance to document the significant role of discrimination 
in determining the employment opportunities of children of Pakistani immigrants in Norway, 
a basic premise of this study is that field experiments of discrimination do not in themselves 
say much about the processes by which this outcome is produced. Thus, the second main 
question underlying the dissertation is how, when, and why the ethnic background of job 
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applicants becomes decisive in employers’ decision-making, linking the findings of this 
dissertation to on-going theoretical debates about the mechanisms of discrimination. 
Methodologically, this question was addressed by complementing the field experiment with 
in-depth interviews with a subsample of the employers who were subjected to research in the 
first stage of the study.  
 In the theory section, I argued that because the field experiment and the subsequent 
employer interviews shed light on the behaviour of individuals within organisational contexts, 
theories at the individual and the organisational levels have proved most relevant for the 
analyses conducted in this dissertation. At the individual level, I have been concerned with the 
complex processes characterising employers’ decision-making. Hiring inevitably involves 
risk. Decisions are made under uncertainty and suffer from limited information about each 
applicant, and choosing the wrong candidate may have consequences for profit and the work 
environment. Moreover, employers will often be confronted with a large number of applicants 
for a listed job, and decisions are made rapidly in most hiring processes. As a consequence, 
social cues like gender, race, and ethnic background are used by employers to categorise and 
rank the applicants at hand. That categorisation process is partly unconscious and partly based 
on the knowledge, experiences, and general beliefs employers have about the group to which 
candidates are ascribed membership (Fiske 1998).  
In economic models of statistical discrimination, employers are assumed to posit 
correct information about average group productivity, and positive experiences with 
individual members of stigmatised groups are expected to lead to updated beliefs about the 
group in question (see Aigner & Cain 1977; Arrow 1973; Phelps 1972; Schwab 1986 for the 
theoretical foundation of this perspective). By contrast, sociological and social-psychological 
models have questioned the extent to which employers possess ‘true’ knowledge of average 
productivity, suggesting instead that stereotypes and erroneous beliefs about underprivileged 
groups account for the prevalence of discrimination (e.g. England 1992; Pager & Karafin 
2009; Quillian & Pager 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs 1999). 
 In analysing the employer interviews, I argue that theories of stereotyping processes 
shed light on employment discrimination of descendants of Pakistani immigrants in Norway. 
First, the negative experiences employers report to have had with previous employees of 
minority backgrounds tend to be generalised across groups. Although economic models of 
employer learning allow for experiences with individuals to shape general beliefs about group 
characteristics, an important question seldom addressed in theoretical discussions is the scope 
of that generalisation. In the material presented in article III, negative experiences with 
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individuals originating from single countries are used as justifications for future rejections of 
applicants from neighbouring countries or broader categories like ‘non-European’ or ‘non-
Western’ origin, and frequently even descendants of immigrants are brought into the equation. 
These findings demonstrate that the scope of generalisation should be carefully scrutinised 
when assessing the relevance of statistical discrimination theory in explaining ethnic 
disadvantage in occupational outcomes. 
 Including children of immigrants in their general beliefs about ethnic minorities, the 
interviews with Norwegian employers also draw attention to a second way in which models of 
statistical discrimination tend to overestimate the accuracy in assessments of group 
productivity. As demonstrated in the section on the Norwegian context, there are large 
differences between immigrants and their descendants in terms of human-capital 
characteristics like educational level and language skills. In fact, although there are important 
differences between various groups, children of immigrants from developing countries are 
close to the majority in school performance and share enrolled in higher education, and some 
groups even outperform their majority peers (Statistics Norway 2012). Still, many scholars 
tend to favour the theory of statistical discrimination when explaining disadvantages 
experienced by the second generation, as if average productivity were highly different. Rather 
than positing accurate knowledge of group productivity, the qualitative findings demonstrate 
that Norwegian employers use foreign names as proxies for immigrant stereotypes, 
constituting a major barrier to employment for a generation currently entering the labour 
market.  
  Although important explanations for discrimination at the micro-level, this 
introduction has argued that individual-level theories of discrimination cannot fully account 
for the complexity revealed by the qualitative material. This relates to an important theoretical 
point guiding this work, which also contains a critique of the field experiment tradition: Most 
field experiments discuss a few individual-level theories as possible explanations of 
discrimination – most frequently taste-based and statistical discrimination, but at times also 
theories of stereotypes or group positioning – and usually conclude that the findings may be 
explained by one or the other. However, data from a field experiment conducted in isolation 
are not particularly suited to assess the mechanisms involved in discriminatory hiring 
practices. Still, theoretical discussions following field experiments tend to imply that they do, 
normally arguing that discrimination should be explained either by racist tendencies, 
statistical uncertainty, or stereotypes.  
64 
 
The interviews analysed in this dissertation indeed demonstrate that many employers 
display both negative attitudes and crude stereotypes of ethnic minorities, and that they use 
these in strategies for risk minimisation. Others express positive or ‘colour-blind’ attitudes 
towards ethnic diversity. However, the extent to which these attitudinal differences actually 
translate into corresponding actions seems to be mediated through the contexts surrounding 
the hiring decisions. In article IV, three factors are highlighted as particularly important: First, 
a striking feature of the employment processes resulting in a discriminatory outcome was the 
large number of résumés received in response to job advertisements. Although few résumés 
for a listed position increases the probability of any résumé resulting in a call-back, the 
interviews with employers suggest that the number of applicants directly shapes the degree to 
which employers can ‘afford’ to discriminate. This indicates that a small pool of relevant 
candidates provides less room for discrimination, more or less regardless of employers’ 
attitudes towards minority workers.  
Second, although a formal education at the college level is often assumed to reduce the 
scope of discrimination, the extent to which such formal requirements are absolute and 
predefined varies considerably by context. Employers in some occupational settings must 
conform to a rigid set of employment rules while others are able to replace formal 
requirements with less specified criteria for selection. This distinction may be illustrated by 
comparing nurses and teachers in the public sector, on the one hand, and IT advisors and 
accountant assistants in the private sector, on the other hand. All of these positions require 
three to four years of college education, but whether the formal criteria actually apply in 
practice differs. For example, applicants without a completed college degree will not be hired 
in permanent positions as nurses or teachers. By contrast, among IT advisors and accountant 
assistants a college degree is relevant, but former experiences and not least personality and 
perceptions of suitability are far more decisive, leaving the question of what constitutes a 
qualified candidate open to employers’ discretion. In terms of hiring outcomes, discretionary 
decisions appear to increase the probability for discriminatory behaviour. 
Third, recruitment procedures vary considerably among the employment processes 
observed. In some cases, hiring decisions are made rapidly and based on first impressions. In 
others, efforts at formalisation are made for standardising the applicants and neutralising the 
impact of bias in the hiring processes. For example, small firms in the private sector, where 
discrimination rates exceed those in larger private companies and in the public sector, often 
report that they screen the quality of the applicants as soon as they receive new résumés. On 
the contrary, firms in the public sector usually use electronic application forms to standardise 
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the résumés and reduce the subjective aspects of screening. Although formalisation in itself is 
not enough to secure equal treatment of ethnic minorities, the interviews suggest that 
formalised recruitment procedures do counteract the biases of first impressions, creating a 
context in which ethnic discrimination is less likely to occur. 
In conclusion, it is important to highlight how micro-level dynamics of exclusion are 
influenced by factors at the organisational level. Discussing the importance of contextual 
factors in determining the probability for unequal treatment does not imply that individual 
motives or stereotyping processes are irrelevant when assessing the causes of discrimination, 
but rather points to ways in which individual actions are embedded in social relations. 
Formalised hiring procedures may prevent negative attitudes and stereotypes from being 
translated into discriminatory behaviour, while employment processes guided by discretionary 
decisions based on first impressions may lead to discrimination despite employers’ best 
intentions. These examples illustrate how contextual and organisational characteristics 
influence the ‘opportunity structure’ for discrimination in ways not acknowledged in the field 
experiment tradition. As Fiske (1998: 375) points out, ‘[m]ost people, given the wrong 
context, are prone to stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. However, most people, given 
the right context, can avoid stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination’. Further exploration of 
how mechanisms at the organisational level shape prospects for discrimination in hiring above 
and beyond individual motives and cognitive biases represents an important research agenda 
for the future.  
 
Some reflections on the findings and their political implications 
Studies of racial or ethnic inequalities in the labour market are usually considered highly 
relevant for policy-making. However, the appropriate direction for the development of social 
policy depends on how these inequalities are explained. A major debate among US scholars 
concerns the relevance of discrimination in explaining contemporary racial and ethnic 
disparities. Influential scholars have argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting 
racial discrimination in key institutions like housing and the labour market, led to a declining 
significance of race (Wilson 1978) and that discrimination is a problem of an earlier era 
(Heckman 1998). Several researchers have argued that existing wage differentials between 
racial groups may be explained by different cognitive test scores measured years before and 
not by wage discrimination in the labour market (Carneiro, Heckman, & Masterov 2005; Neal 
& Johnson 1996). Based on similar findings, Heckman (1998: 101) argues that ‘most of the 
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disparity in earnings between blacks and whites in the labor market of the 1990s is due to 
differences in skills they bring to the market, and not to discrimination within the labor 
market’. The logical policy answer to this analysis would be to strengthen the efforts to 
decrease premarket disparities resulting from, for example, racial neighbourhood segregation 
and differences in the quality of schools.  
 Although this discussion originates from the particular context of US race relations, it 
resonates with important debates about integration policies and anti-discrimination legislation 
well known in European countries, including Norway. Regularly, ethnic inequalities in the 
labour market are explained by disparities in language proficiency, access to social networks, 
and level of educational attainment, which are used as the basis for increasing integration 
efforts with the ambition of ‘levelling the playing field’ among immigrants and natives. 
However, if ethnic inequalities also are produced through discrimination in processes of 
employment, wage negotiation, and workplace cultures that systematically favour the 
dominant group – and particularly if these disadvantages are transferred to the second 
generation – this points to the need for complementing integration policies by strengthening 
the frameworks of anti-discrimination legislation.  
Field experiments have the advantage of documenting the prevalence of discrimination 
in employment, making it a tempting method for social scientists who aim at contributing to 
the reduction of ethnic inequality. Still, most discrimination research, even when based on 
data from field experiments, usually leaves the mechanisms involved in discriminatory 
practices well hidden in ‘black boxes’. This is a major problem when assessing what policy 
implications field experiment research should have. As Elster (1998: 53) notes in a discussion 
of mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences, it matters what factors influence an 
outcome of interest and the relative strengths between these factors. It matters for 
theoretically grasping the dynamics of contemporary discrimination, and it matters for further 
political and legal development. Merton (1976: 197) relates this point directly to 
discrimination research by pointing out that ‘[k]nowing simply that ethnic discrimination is 
rife in a community does not therefore point to appropriate lines of social policy’. So what 
bearing do the findings of this multi-method study have for the political and legal efforts to 
prevent ethnic discrimination in the Norwegian labour market? 
Findings from field experiments have often been used as arguments for strengthening 
minorities’ legal protection against discrimination. In some contexts, even more controversial 
policy measures have also been debated. Most notably, many European countries have 
recently discussed anonymous applications as a means of arriving at equal treatment in 
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employment, and some of them – e.g. Germany, France, and Sweden – have implemented 
these measures. Anonymous applications may appear as an attractive policy instrument for 
combating discrimination in employment. However, recent evaluations draw a mixed picture 
in terms of its success, documenting, for example, that although ethnic minorities are more 
frequently invited to job interviews when applications are anonymous, they do not seem to 
experience an increase in actual job offers (Behaghel, Crepon, & Le Barbanchonz 2012; 
Krause, Rinne, & Zimmermann 2012; Åslund & Skans 2012).  
 A more powerful contribution to combating discrimination would be a strengthening 
of the proactive measures already in place. As previously mentioned, all public firms and 
private firms with more than 50 employees in Norway are obliged to actively promote 
equality on the grounds of ethnic background, but many employers are not aware of these 
obligations, and those who are may not know what they entail in practice (Tronstad 2010). A 
specification of the content of the proactive duties in the Anti-Discrimination Act, combined 
with more efforts to spread information about them and to sanction employers who do not 
comply, is already recommended by several expert committees evaluating different aspects of 
Norway’s legal apparatus for combating discrimination and promoting gender and ethnic 
equality (NOU 2009: 14; NOU 2011: 18). The findings of this dissertation, demonstrating 
how rules and procedures at the organisational level shape the prospects for discriminatory 
hiring practices, generally support these ideas.  
When assessing the proactive legal framework, it is also important to keep in mind the 
large differences in discrimination rates among the public and private sectors, and the fact that 
discrimination seems to be most prevalent in small, private firms where hiring procedures are 
least formalised; that is, among employers who are not legally obliged to take any proactive 
steps in terms of promoting ethnic equality today. Including all employers in the legal 
requirements for proactivity, as is the case for gender, seems to be a small but necessary step 
towards equality in recruitment, although it will probably lead to controversies. Intervening in 
the functioning of the labour market, by prohibitions or demands of proactive measures, will 
always create debates because it restricts the sovereignty of employers in making the 
decisions they find to be in the company’s best interest. Still, the findings of this study clearly 
suggest that employers’ decisions in sum constitute major barriers to employment, and these 
barriers should be addressed more directly by legal and political efforts.  
The extent to which these reflections will have any impact on future development 
remains to be seen. In terms of the public debate in Norway, the most important contribution 
of this dissertation may simply be an end to the ever-lasting discussion of whether ethnic 
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discrimination in employment actually occurs, shifting focus to the important question of how 
this problem can best be addressed. Discrimination does constitute a significant barrier to 
labour market inclusion even for children of immigrants currently coming of age. This 
represents a major problem for a group of individuals who are disadvantaged in translating 
their impressive achievements in the educational system into relevant work. It is a problem for 
employers depriving themselves of skilled labour. And it constitutes both a moral and a 
financial challenge for the Norwegian welfare state, which cannot accept that a large fraction 
of its population is systematically disadvantaged in getting access to occupational positions.  
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4 Critique of the audit method
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4.2 Heckman’s critique of the audit method
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6.1 The advantage of combining methods
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6.2 Complicating empirical illustrations
$X$K	 4	*&*Z%	*'	/&;%	/$;	*%X*$;$	%&;%	 %	
&%&/[	*$%;;	/	Z*	*	%%	/%[	/%`	j*	X&		%ZX[6	ZX*[
%	 '/*&$K	 4	 Z/_*[	 /XX/$	 /	 QX;	 *	 ;%X/[	 %*Z	
%*	*'	*$%*&%	*	&$*$%*&%	//	9/%	ZX*[%	\4*	X/%	
%[ZZ/	/Z$	*'	4	\*	/XX/$%	/	%$	/%	**&	9$;	
/$;	&$9/%;	/$;	4	'\	ZX*[%	/&/[	'/*&$K	4	Z$*[	
/XX/$	/	 4	QX$%	*'	 4	Z/_*[	/$;;/	/	QX;	*	
X%$	<Z%	\4	%*Z	`$;	*'	/'<Z/	/*$	X*[	=*\6	
%&4	 %/K4'*\/;	 /%%&ZX*$%	 /9*&	 4	 /*$%4X	 9\$	
/&%	 /$;	 ''	 $	 <;	 QXZ$%	 Z/[	 9	 4/$K;	 9[	 /$/
[%$K	 \*	ZX/	 Q/ZX%	 '*Z	*&	 $\%	\4	*\K/$	
ZX*[%	\4*	4/	9$	4*&K4	4	$/	%$K	%/K
j4	<%	Q/ZX	%	/$	$\	\4	/	Z/$/K	*'	/	X&9	$&%
$K	4*Z	*&%;	*'	%*	\4	*$[	4	Z/_*[	/XX/$	;	
/	/9/`		4	$\6	4	ZX*[	\/%	/	<%	%&X%;	4/	
4	%	4/;	$;;	&X	4/	\/[6	;&	*	4%	%'&$;%/$;$K	/%	*
/$	*'	4$	;%[	/$;	9/&%	4	$&%$K	4*Z	//;[	4/;	
/$	4$/[	4*K$*&%	\*`'*	$K	&X*$	 4	 %&6	
4	Z$*$;	4/	4	*&;	4/	/;	4	\/[	4	;;	9/&%	4	
<Z	4/;	/	4$K	X*[	\44	/Z;	/	/*;$K	 4	;*Z$/$	*'	
/$[	X/&/	4$	K*&X	#	*	$%&	4/	*\K/$	Z/$;	4	
<Z{%	Z/$	/$K&/K
j4	 %*$;	 Q/ZX	 X%$%	 /	 /4	 /	 $;$	 $	 *&	
Z//	 9/&%	 	 %	 *$	 *'	 '\	 Q/ZX%	 $	 \44	 4	 *$[	 /X
X/$	\4*	;	/	/9/`	\/%	4	/$;;/	\4	/	Z$*[	
9/`K*&$;	j4%	$\%6	4	/%%%/$	;*	/$;	/	%*$	
Z/$/K	*'	/	X/	 $%&/$	*ZX/$[	 $	%*	[	$6	\	
/%*	%&X%;	\4$	*$'*$;	\4	 4	%&	*'	 4	%	#	9&	 '*	
4	*XX*%	/%*$	/4	4/$	4/$K	/$	/'<Z/	/*$	X*[6	
4	*ZX/$[	4/;	$*	QX	 $$*$	*'	 $/%$K	 4	$&Z9	*'	
4$	Z$*[	ZX*[%	$	4*&K4	*$[	*$	*'	4		ZX*[%	
\/%	*'	'*K$	;%$	$%/;6	4	/%%%/$	;*	QX%%;	4	
\;[	4;	\	4/	_*9	/XX/$%	\4	/	Z$*[	9/`K*&$;	4/	
*	4/	9	]&/</*$%	4/$	Z/_*[	/XX/$%	*	9	*$%;;	
*'	]&/	/&	'*	4	*ZX/$[
j4	 \*	 Q/ZX%	 /	 $%$K	 9/&%	 4[	 4/$K	 4	
ZZ;/	 $X/*$	 *'	 4	 %&%	 `$*\$	 '*Z	 /	 <;	
QXZ$%	j*	9	%&6	 4	Z/$/K	*'	 4	X&9	$&%$K	4*Z	
/%9;	/	/`	*'	`$*\;K	*'	4	*\K/$	/$K&/K	Z[	;&	
*	4	'*K$	%*&$;$K	$/Z	*'	4	/XX/*$	j4	\/%	$*4$K	
$	4	%&Z	*	/XX/*$		'*Z	4	Z$*[	/$;;/	\44	
$;/;	 4/	 4	 \/%	 /	 4/	 *	 4	 /$K&/K	 /	 4	 <Z	 *$	 4	
*$/[6	/$	 ZX*/$	/Z	*'	 4	<;	QXZ$	\/%	 *	Z/%&	
4	 Q$	 $	 \44	 4;$	 *'	 ZZK/$%	 #	 6	 $;;&/%	 \4*	
4/	K*\$	&X	 $	*\/[	/$;	\	4/	/4;	 $K&%	&$[	
$	*\K/$	\4$	4[	$	4	/9*&	Z/`	#	/	QX$$K	
ZX*[Z$	;%Z$/*$	=*\6	4	4*K$*&%	\*`'*	
/	4	$&%$K	4*Z	K/	$*	*$%%$	$;/*$%	*'	;%Z$/*$	
*$	4	X/	*'	4	Z/$/K6	*	4/	4	$Q	Z$*[	/XX/$	\*&;	
9	/;	4	%/Z	\/[
j4	 /%	 *'	 4	 $%&/$	 *ZX/$[	 %	 $	 Z*	 $%$K	
4*&K4	\	QX;	4	'\	*ZX/$%	\44	'/*&;	4	Z$*[	
/XX/$%	*	&$	/$	QX	/'<Z/	/*$	X*[6	4	$\%	
\	/Z*$K	4	Z*%	/	%X*`$	$	*&	;//	Z//	$	%/[$K	4/	
Z$*[	/XX/$%	4/	*	X*	4Z%%	more	X*;&	4/$	
4	Z/_*[	X%	*	9	*$%;;	/%	]&/	/$;;/%	'*	/	_*9	
j4/	 4	 Z$*[	 /$;;/	 \/%	 X';	 $	 4%	 /%	 4&%	 ZK4	
4/	9$	/	*$;$6	9&	/	$	4	$\	4	/%%%/$	;
*	*'	4	$%&/$	*ZX/$[	/%*	Z$*$;	4/	;&	*	/	$	
4/$K	$	4	4$	*ZX*%*$	*'	4	$	4[	4/;	;%&%%;	
4	/$	*'	4$K	/	Z&$K&/	/$;;/	'*	4%	X*%*$6	\44	
ZK4	QX/$	4%	/4	*$/;*[	<$;$K	$	/$[	/%6		%4*&;	
9	/XX/$	 4/	 $%K4	 $*	 4	*$Q%	 $	\44	4$K	;%*$%	
/	Z/;	*ZX/%	4	$/	$'$%	*$	\*&;	;/\	'*Z	4	
*&*Z%	*'	/	<;	QXZ$
7 	

		
}4/	 /	 4	 Z4*;**K/	 ZX/*$%	 *'	 4%	 ZX/	
&%/*$%~	 =`Z/$	 *$&;%	 4/	 4	 X*$/	 9/%$K	
''%	*'	&$*9%/9	//9%	/	4	<Z		%4*&;	/;	*	4	
208 Authenticated | 193.157.109.68
Download Date | 10/17/12 1:55 PM
/9*%4Z$	*'	<;	QXZ$%	/%	/	Z4*;	'*	%&;[$K	4	Q$	
*'	 ;%Z$/*$	 $	 ;''$	 Z/`	 *$Q%	 j4	 \*	 Q/ZX%	
;%&%%;	/9*	 $;;	%&KK%	 4/	 '/*%	&$*9%/9	 '*	 4	
<;	 QXZ$	 %/4	 %4*&;	 $*	 9	 $K;	 7Z%	 /$;	
$;&%%	;''	$	Z%	*'	4	4$	*ZX*%*$	*'	4	\*`'*6	
4	 QX$%	 ZX*[%	 4/	 \4	 Z/$/K$K	 4$/[	 ;%	
\*`X/%6	 /$;	 4[	 ;''	 $	 Z%	 *'	 *K/$%/*$/	 X*%	 /$;	
&Z$	%/K%	j4%	 '/*%	/	 _&%	%*Z	*'	Z/$[	\44	
Z/[	/''	4	4$K	;%*$%	ZX*[%	Z/`6	/$;	K$*$K	4Z	
Z/[	9/%	*&	&$;%/$;$K	*'	4	;[$/Z%	*'	;%Z$/*$
	 %6	 4*\6	 '/	 '*Z	 *K$%$K	 4	 ZX*/$	 *'	 *$Q
&/	`$*\;K	*'	<Z	4//%%	/$;	&Z$	%/K%	 $	
$X$K	 4	<$;$K%	 '*Z	<;	QXZ$%	 *	%&KK%	 4/	 4%	
$	/;*$	*'	;%Z$/*$	%/4	%	\4*&	%$<	/&	
=`Z/$%	]&	*'	4	/&;	Z4*;	;*%	K$*	4	*\4Z$K	
'/	4/	'*		[/%	%***K%%	/$;	*$*Z%%	4/	;*&Z$;	
4/	 4$	 /$;	 //	 ;%Z$/*$	 *$$&	 *	 %4/X	 4	 /%%	
*	*XX*&$%	'*	[*&$K	Z$	/$;	\*Z$	/*%%	/	\;	/$K	*'	
*&$%	j4%	%/4	/$$*	9	***`;6	9&	 	 %	Z	*	/;
;%%	%*Z	*'	 %	Z4*;**K/	 Z/*$%	$	ZX*/$	\/[	*'	
;*$K	 4%	 %	 *	*Z9$	<;	QXZ$%	\4	]&//	Z4*;%	
9/&%	&/	`$*\;K	*'	 4	*$Q	*'	ZX*[Z$%	/$;	4	
Z4/$%Z%	$*;	$	;%Z$/*[	X/%	/$$*	9	/%%;	
\4*&	%*Z	%*	*'	]&//	/XX*/4
j4%	 Z4*;**K/	 %/$	 /%*	 4/%	 4*/	 ZX/*$%	
$	 %&;%	 4/	 9**\;	 $%K4	 '*Z	 %*/	 X%[4**K[	 $	
X/&/	 7%`	 "6	 /K&$K	 4/	 &$*$%*&%[	 \*`$K	 %
*[X%	 Z/[	 QX/$	 \4[	 //	 /$;	 4$	 Z$*%	 *$$&	 *	
QX$	&$]&/	/%%	*	*XX*&$[	%	K6	^ /$;6	4&K4	
	 &/$/4/$	 	 %`$	 	 %`$	 	 &/$	 ; 
**4		&/$		&/$		/K	"	}	/K	 4/	
%*[X%	 /	 ZX*/$	 /&%%	 *'	 ;%Z$/*$6	 /$;	 4*X	 4/	
4	 /;*X*$	 *'	 X%X%	 '*Z	 %*/	 X%[4**K[	 Z/[	 *''	 /	
\/[	*&	*'	4	/%$K	;%&%%*$	*'	Z*9/%;	QX/$/*$%	
\	 `$*\$	 '*Z	 4	*$*Z%	 /&	%;	 $	 /*$	 *	 <;	
QXZ$	%/46	4*\6	4%	4*/	;%&%%*$%	$;	*	
/%%&Z	 4/	 /	 ;%Z$/*[	 *&*Z%	Z/[	9	QX/$;	9[	 4	
%/Z	'/*	6	%*[X%"6	\4	4	/&%%	*'	]&/	/Z$	
/$;	 z%{	 ;%Z$/*$	 /	 /9/`	 *$[	 '*	 4	 Z$*[	 /X
X/$"	 /	 %;*Z	/;;%%;	j4	 ZX/*$	*'	 4%	 $;$[	 %	
$*	 _&%	 4/	 4	%&/*$%	\4	ZX*[%	/	 z/&K4	 $	 4	/{	
*'	;%Z$/*$	/	4	*$[	/%%	\*4	4*%$K	8/$K	*4	
*&*Z%	 &$QX/$;	 /$;	 4	 X*%%9[	 '*	 Z;/$K	 *$Q&/	
'/*%	X*;$K	Z*	*	%%	**Z	'*	;%Z$/*$	&$/;;%%;6	
\4/	 %/;	 /%	 /	 Z4*;**K/	 X*9Z	 4	 Z/*$%	 *'	 <;	
QXZ$%"	 4/%	 *$%]&$%	 '*	 4	 4*/	 *$9&*$%	
*	 4	 %/4	*$	;%Z$/*$	/$;	4$	 $]&/[	 $	%/4
$K	 4	%&'/	*'	 4	*&*Z	$&Z9%	\	/	 Z$;;	 4/	 4	
X*%%%	$	\44	4$[	*Z	*	Z/	/	4K4[	*ZXQ	/$;	
4/	 4	 $X/*$	*'	 4	<$;$K%	'*Z	<;	QXZ$%	%4*&;	
9	 /;	 \4	 /&*$	 }4	 4	 %&%	 *'	 %/4	 &%$K	 *$[	
4	 %$K	 4$]&	 /	 &$/9	 *	 /'[	 Z*	 4/$	 4	 '/	 4/	
;%Z$/*$	 $	 ZX*[Z$%	 Q%%6	 %&XXZ$$K	 <;	 QX
Z$%	\4	]&//	/XX*/4%	*ZX/	4%	*$%;;	X&	
*'	 4	;%Z$/*$	*ZXQ6	X/$K	4	\/[	'*	$\	$%K4%	 $*	
4	;[$/Z%	*'	*$ZX*/[	;%Z$/*$
8 Conclusion
$	4%	/6	\	4/	/K&;	4/	/	*Z9$/*$	*'	*%X*$;$	
%$K	/$;	$;X4	$\%	\4	ZX*[%	X%$%	/$	$$*/
	 \/[	 *	 /;;%%	 ]&%*$%	 *'	 4	 Q$	 /$;	 /&%%	 *'	 4$	
;%Z$/*$	 $	 4	 /9*&	 Z/`	 %$K	 *$[	 4	 /&;	 *	 *
%X*$;$	4$]&	Z/[	%&	$	*$&%*$%	9/%;	*$	$%&'<$	
`$*\;K	 *'	 4	 *$Q	 *'	 ZX*[Z$	 /$;	 49[	 $/%$K	
4	;/$K	*'	;/\$K	$'$%	*$	/	\*$K	9/%%	+&XXZ$$K	
4	%$K	\4	]&//	$\%6	*$	4	*4	4/$;6	$/9%	/	
Z*	%&9%/$/	&$;%/$;$K	*'	 4	X*%%%	 /;$K	 *	4$	
$]&/[	$	4	/9*&	Z/`6	4&%	*''$K	9*4	Z4*;**K/	/$;	
4*/	/;/$/K%	*	%$KZ4*;	/XX*/4%	*	4	%&;[	
*'	;%Z$/*$
}4[	 %	 	 ZX*/$	 *	/;;%%	4	Q$	/$;	/&%%	*'	4$	
;%Z$/*$~	}44	*	$*	;%Z$/*$	%	/$	ZX*/$	'/*	
QX/$$K	4$	;''$/%	$	4	/9*&	Z/`	%	%	/	;9/;	
]&%*$6	/$;	4	/$%\	4/%	%K$</$	ZX/*$%	'*	4	;
*XZ$	 *'	 %*/	 X*[	 7;	 QXZ$%	 &%&/[	 ;*&Z$	 4/	
;%Z$/*$	$	4	/9*&	Z/`	Q%%6	X*;$K	/	Z*	*	 %%	
QX	*ZZ$;/*$	*	%$K4$		K4%	/\	$	4	9/%%	
*'	/	/	;%%*$	*'	4	/&;	Z4*;6	4*\6	=`Z/$	"	
/K&%	4/	//	;''$%	$	$*Z	/$;	ZX*[Z$	$	4	+	
/	;&	*	4	;''$	%`%	//	K*&X%	9$K	to	4	Z/`6	/$;	
$*	*	;%Z$/*$	within	4	Z/`	*;$K	*	4Z6	4	ZX*
/$	 /%`%	 /	 %`	 X*Z**$	 4*&K4	 4	 ZX*Z$	 *'	 %4**%	
/$;	$K49*&4**;%
j4%	;%X/$[	$	4	ZX/*$%	*'	%/4	%&%	&%/%	
4	 ZX*/$	 *'	 &$;%/$;$K	 4	 Z4/$%Z%	 /$K	 4$	
;''$/%	 $	 4	 /9*&	 Z/`	 +&4	 /$	 &$;%/$;$K	 $&;%	
/	 '*&%	*$	 4	ZX*[%6	\4*6	 4*&K4	 4	 *	/%	K/`X%6	
;Z$	/%%	*	*XX*&$%	$	4	/9*&	Z/`	%X	4	
K/	X**$	*'	4$	Z$*%	 $	4$K	X*%%%6	ZX*[%	
4/	4	/&*$*Z[	*	;Z$	\4*	%	4;	/$;	\4*	%	$*6	/$;	4[	
4/	/	\;	/$K	*'	KZ/	/K&Z$%	*	_&%'[	4	;%*$%	
=$		%	/	4/	/$	&$;%/$;$K	*'	\4[6	\4$	/$;	&$;	\4/	
*$;*$%	ZX*[%	;%Z$/	%	*'	&$]&%*$/9	/$	'*	
4	K/	/$;	X*/	Z/$%	*	X$	%&4	;%Z$/*$
Acknowledgments
j4	 /&4*%	 /	 K/'&	 '*	 /&/9	 *ZZ$%	 '*Z	 	
^*4Z/$$6	*4$	}$46	/$;	\*	/$*$[Z*&%	'%6	/%	\	/%	
209Authenticated | 193.157.109.68
Download Date | 10/17/12 1:55 PM
'*Z	4	%/4	K*&X	|]&/[6	$&%*$	/$;	ZK/*$	/	$%&	
'*	 +*/	 %/46	 %*6	 /$;	 X/X/$%	 /	 /	 %Z$/	 4;	 /	
$%&	/*$/	;{|&;%	Z*K/X4]&%6	/%6	*$	&[		
					4*;%	/$		$	%***K[	'*Z	4	$%[	*'	
%*	/$;	%	/	4	/$;;/	/	$%&	'*	+*/	%/4	$	%*6	
*\/[	=	4/%	*$9&;	*	%/	//;Z	_*&$/%	$	*\/[6	
\$K	*$	 4	;''$%	9\$	*\/[6	$Z/`	/$;	+\;$	
*$	4	<;%	*'	$/*$/[	K%/*$6	$%4X	/$;	$K/*$	X*
%6	/$;	*$	;ZZ/%	*$$$K	/%Z	/$;	4$	;%Z$/*$	
$	 4	 /9*&	Z/`	=%	 &$	4	X*_	 *$$%	 4	$/&	
/$;	/&%%	*'	ZX*[Z$	;%Z$/*$	*'	4$	Z$*%	/$;	4	
X*/	/$;	_&;/	;ZZ/%	'**\$K	%&4	;%Z$/*$
!		 %	%/4	*	/	7/'*#$%&	'*	8/9*&	
/$;	 +*/	 %/4	 *K%/;	 4/%	 \$	 %/	 9**`%	 /$;	 /
%	*$$$K	;%Z$/*$6	%*/	Q&%*$6	/$;	 /9*	Z/`	
X/X/*$	 /%	 \	 /%	 X*/	 Z*9/*$6	 %*/	 Z*Z$%	
/$;	 /$%$/*$/	 $K/KZ$	Z*$K	 4%	 $	 X&9/*$%	 /	
{$/%Z	/$;	%*/	Z*Z$%	j4	ZX*/$	*'	/	$%{	
Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies6		\4	/	|$;	|%X/$;"6	
/$;	zj4		*'	&/*$	j4	;/*$	*'	*/	|$K/KZ$	$	
&&&/	\*`%{6	Social Movement Studies6		\4	KK*	
%"
Notes
	 j4	X*_	\/%	%&9Z;	*	j4	/*$/	|4/	*ZZ	
'*	%/4	 $	j4	+*/	+$%	/$;	=&Z/$%	|+="	
$	*\/[	$	+XZ9		/$;	;	/XX*/	$	/4	
	j*	Z$Z%	4	4/	4/$K%	$*;	$	4	;%K$6	
X/&/[	4	X*$/	$K/	*$%]&$%	'*	4	ZX*[
%	4/	\	*$'*$;	\4	4	*&*Z	*'	4	;%*$%6	\	
/*;;	 /$[	 $*Z/	 z9/Z$K{	 *'	 4	 ZX*[%{	 ;%*$%	
7&4Z*6	 *	 X/X/	 $	 4	 $\%	 4	 ZX*[%	
4Z%%	4/;	*	%X*$;	*	/	\$	$/*$6	X*;$K	/$	
$'*Z;	*$%$	$	4	%*$;	X/	*'	4	%&;[	j4	*K$/	
/XX/*$	 *	|+=6	 4	%&9%]&$	;%&%%*$	/$;	 4	<$/	
	*'	/XX*/	/$	9	'*&$;	$	*K%/;	/$;	;9>$	"
	 &;	%$K	%	]&/$	*	situation testing6	\44	4/%	9$	
/	Z*	\;[	&%;	Z	$	|&*X/$	%/46	9&	;''%	'*Z	
correspondence testing	\44	\	9*Z	/XX/$	/	*$	$	
4%	/	*	K$/	*$X%	$&;$K	/	4	;''$	%
$K	4$]&%	/	z;%Z$/*$	%$K{	*	z<;	QXZ$%{
!	 ^[	 /$K	 4	4/	4/$K%	 $*;	 $	QXZ$/	 
%/4	/	4%	X*$6	\	;*	$*	%&KK%	4/	%&4	4/$K%	/	
&$ZX*/$	$	*&	*X$*$6	4	X*9Z%	*$$$K	4	4/	
;Z$%*$	*'	<;	QXZ$%	4/	9$	**	X**[	/;;%%;	
$	4	/&	j4	/	/%*$%	*	]&%*$	/	']&$	&%	
*'	%&4	Z4*;%	&$%%	4	%/4	;%K$	/*\%	'*	/	Z*	
%&9%/$/	&$;%/$;$K	*'	4	Z4/$%Z%	/;$K	*	4$	
$]&/[	7;	QXZ$%	*$;&;	\4*&	9$K	%&XX
Z$;	\4	*4	Z4*;%6	\	/K&6	;*	$*	4/	4	/9[	*	
%4;	K4	*$	Z&4	Z*	4/$	4	'/	4/	;%Z$/*$	Q%%	
/$;	4	/$	*'	/4	$\	X*_	%4*&;	*$%]&$[	9	
4/[	%&$%;	+	;9>$	/$;	*K%/;	"	'*	/$	
/9*/*$	*'	4%	/K&Z$	/$;	*K%/;	/$;	;9>$	"	
'*	/	;/;	/*&$	*'	4	X*%%	/;$K	*	4	/XX*/	*'	
4%	&$	X*_	9[	|+=
	 $K	 "	 ;*%	 /`$*\;K6	 4*\6	 4/	 4	 /&%%	
*'	;%Z$/*$	Z/[	9	Z&'/;	/$;	 4/	Z*	%/4	
%	 $;;	 *	 '&4	 QX*	 4	 Z4/$%Z%	 $*;	 $	 ;%
Z$/*[	 X/%	 $	 4	 Z/`	 X/	 +6	 4	 /%	 4	
ZX%%*$	 4/	 <;	 QXZ$%	 /$	 /%%%%	 4%	 %&/*$6	
\44	\	/K&	4[	/$$*
	 =`Z/$	 Z%	 4	;%&%%*$	 *	/&;	 %$K	&%;	 *	 $%
K/	 4$	 ;%Z$/*$	 $	 4	 /9*&	 Z/`6	 /$;	 \	 \	
*$$/	*$	4%	//	$	4	%&9%]&$	%*$%
	 j*	X&		Z*	4$/[6	4	$	;%Z$/*$	/	%	%Z/;	
9[	;;$K	4	;''$	9\$	4	X*%	%X*$%%	\4	
*$[	4	Z/_*[	/$;;/	\/%	X';	/$;	4	X*%	
%X*$%%	\4	*$[	4	Z$*[	/XX/$	\/%	X';6	\4	
4	%&Z	*'	/	X*%	 %X*$%%	j4%	 %	 4	Z*%	 ']&$[	
&%;	Z/%&	'*	;%Z$/*$	$	4	/&
	 j4	*	\/[	 *	/&/	 4	;%Z$/*$	 /	 %	/$	*$
K*$K	 ;9/	 $	 4	 /&	 /$;	 4/%	 9$	 Z*%	 ;%&%%;	
X*9Z	$	4	/'Z/4	*'	=`Z/${%	]&	$	4%	/6	
\	 \	 *$$/	 *$	 4%	 *4	 *9_*$%	 *	 4	 %$K	 /X
X*/46	9&	%	/K	!"	/$;	/K	/$;	*/K&%	"	
'*	Q$	Q/ZX%	*'	\44	%&%	'*Z	<;	QXZ$%	
Z/[	9	X%$;	$	/%[	$X/9	\/[%	\44	/	4	%/Z	
Z	Z	=`Z/$%{	*9_*$%
	 +\4$K	'*Z	/&;%	*	*%X*$;$	%$K	/%*	4/%	4
/	*$%]&$%	*ZX$K	4	'&	ZX*[Z$	X*%%	9[	
\44	 ZX*[%	 4/	 *	 Z/`	 /	 ;%*$	 /%	 *	 \44	 4	
<*&%	 $X%*$	 /XX/$%	 %4*&;	 K	 /	 _*9	 *''	 *	 $*6	
/%	 %	 4	 /%	 \4$	 *$;&$K	 /$	 /&;	 %&;[6	 %	 '/	 Z*	
4/$K$K	 4/$	 $	 *%X*$;$	 %$K6	 \4	 /&/	
$/*$	9\$	 $;;&/%	;*%	$*	 /`	X/	/	/	/$;	
\	 4	 X*%%	 %	 <$%4;	 /	 /$	 /	 %/K	 j4	 4/	
X*9Z%	 //4;	 *	 4	 /&;	 Z4*;	 /6	 4*\6	 $*	 *'	
=`Z/${%	*$$
	 ZZK/$%	 *'	 /`%/$	 4/K	 *ZX%	 *$	 *'	 4	 /K%	
ZZK/$	*ZZ&$%	$	*\/[	/$;	\	/Z*$K	4	<%	*'	
4	z$\{	ZZK/$%	*	/	$	4	/	%	^*4Z/$$		
_;%/;	"	$	6	4	4;$	*'	/`%/$	ZZK/$%	
'&4Z*	 *$%&;	 !	 X	 $	 *'	 4	 %*/;	 z%*$;	
K$/*${	$	*\/[	%$	"6	Z/`$K	4%	K*&X	%&/9	
'*	/	<;	QXZ$
210 Authenticated | 193.157.109.68
Download Date | 10/17/12 1:55 PM
References
Allasino, E, Reyneri, E, Venturini, A & Zincone, G 2004, Labour mar-
ket discrimination against migrant workers in Italy, International 
	

Arrow, KJ 1998, ‘What has economics to say about racial discrimi-
nation?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 
91–100.
Attström, K 2007, Discrimination against native swedes of immigrant 
origin in access to employment. A research study on Stockholm, 
Malmö and Gothenburg, utilizing the ILO discrimination practice 
	

Banton, M 1994, Discrimination, Open University Press, Bucking-
ham.
Banton, M 1997, ‘The ethics of practice-testing’, New Community, 
vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 413–420.
Bertrand, M, Chugh, D & Mullainathan, S 2005, ‘Implicit discrimina-
tion’, The American Economic Review, vol. 95, no. 2, pp. 94–98.
Bertrand, M & Mullainathan, S 2004, ‘Are Emily and Greg Morge em-
!"#$!
market discrimination’, The American Economic Review, vol. 90, 
no. 4, pp. 991–1013.
Blank, RM, Dabady, M & Citro, CF (eds) 2004, Measuring racial dis-
crimination. Panel on methods for assessing discrimination, Na-
tional Research Council, Commitee on National Statistics, Divi-
sion of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National 
Academies Press, Washington, DC.
Bovenkerk, F 1992, Testing discrimination in natural experiments. A 
manual for international comparative research on discrimination 
on the grounds of “race” and ethnic origin, International Labour 
	

Brochmann, G & Kjeldstadli, K 2008, A history of immigration. The 
case of Norway 900–2000, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
%'+//;<=>!"#$!

existence of ethnic discrimination in the hiring process’, Work-
ing Paper 2007:7, p. Stockholm University Linnaeus Centre for 
Integration Studies.
Carlsson, M 2009, Essays on discrimination in hiring, Växjö Univer-
sity, Ph. D Thesis. Department of Economics and Statistics.
Carlsson, M & Rooth, DO 2007, ‘Evidence of ethnic discrimination 
in the Swedish labor market using experimental data’, Labour 
Economics, vol. 14, pp. 716–729.
Cediey, E & Foroni, F 2008, Discrimination in access to employment 
on grounds of foreign origin in France: a national survey of dis-
crimination based on the testing methodology of the internation-

	

Daniel, W 1968, Racial discrimination in England, Penguin Books, 
Middlesex.
Darity, WA & Mason, PL 1998, ‘Evidence on discrimination in employ-
ment: codes of color, codes of gender’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 63–90.
Fiske, S 1998, ‘Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination’, in The 
handbook of social psychology, 4 edn, vol. 2, eds D Gilbert, S 
Fiske & G Lindzey, McGrew Hill, New York, pp. 357–411.
Fix, M & Struyk, RJ (eds) 1993, Clear and convincing evidence: 
measurement of discrimination in America, The Urban Institute 
Press, Washington D. C.
Heckman, J 1998, ‘Detecting discrimination’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 101–116.
Heckman, J & Siegelman, P 1993, ‘The urban institute audit studies: 
!>QX
measurement of discrimination in America, eds M Fix & RJ 
Struyk, The Urban Institute Press, Washington D. C.
Jackson, M 2009, ‘Disadvantaged through discrimination? The role 

!>[%
\-
ology, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 669–692.
Kaas, L & Manger, C 2012, ‘Ethnic discrimination in Germany’s la-
!X$!>!]!^ _
13, no. 1, pp. 1–20.
Kirschenman, J & Neckerman, KM 1991, ‘‘We’d love to hire them, 
but...’: the meaning of race to employers’, in The urban un-
derclass, eds C Jencks & PE Peterson, Brookings Institution, 
Washington.
Ladd, HF 1998, ‘Evidence on discrimination in mortgage lending’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 41–62.
Loury, GC 1998, ‘Discrimination in the post-civil rights era: beyond 
market interactions’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, 
no. 2, pp. 117–126.
Midtbøen, AH & Rogstad, J 2008, ‘Diskrimineringens art, omfang og 
årsaker’, Søkelys på arbeidslivet, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 417–429.
Midtbøen, AH & Rogstad, J 2012, Diskrimineringens omfang og år-
saker. Etniske minoriteters tilgang til norsk arbeidsliv. Institutt for 
samfunnsforskning, ISF-rapport 2012:001, Oslo.
Moss, P & Tilly, C 2001, Stories employers tell. Race, skill, and hiring 
in America, Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Neumark, D 2010, Detecting discrimination in audit and correspon-
dence testing in Working Paper 16448, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Cambridge.
Nilsson, A 2006, Gränsvakter: Tankestilar och sortering vid rekryter-
ing av personal i sex kommuner, CEIFO, Stockholm University, 
Doctoral dissertation. Stockholm.
Olsen, B 2011, Unge med innvandrerbakgrunn i arbeid og utdanning 
2009, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo/Kongsvinger.
Pager, D 2003, ‘The mark of a criminal record’, American Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 108, no. 5, pp. 937–975.
q{+//;<[
$!

!-
ment discrimination: contributions, critiques, and directions for 
the future’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, vol. 609, no. 1, pp. 104–133.
211Authenticated | 193.157.109.68
Download Date | 10/17/12 1:55 PM
q{}~{+//<%"\!-
tion, stereotypes, and employer decision making’, The ANNALS 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 
621, pp. 70–93.
Pager, D & Quillian, L 2005, ‘Walking the talk? What employers say 
versus what they do’, American Sociological Review, vol. 70, no. 
3, pp. 355–380.
Pager, D & Shepherd, H 2008, ‘The sociology of discrimination: ra-
cial discrimination in employment, housing, credit and consumer 
markets’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 34, pp. 181–209.
Pager, D, Western, B & Bonikowski, B 2009, ‘Discrimination in a low-
_ !X$!>#!\
Review, vol. 74, pp. 777–799.
Petersen, T 2008, ‘Discrimination: conscious or nonconscious?’, in 
\X-
spective, ed. DB Grusky, Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 780–
785.
Petersen, T, Saporta, I & Seidel, M-DL 2000, ‘Offering a job: meritoc-
racy and social networks’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 
106, no. 3, pp. 763–816.
Quillian, L 2006, ‘New approaches to understanding racial prejudice 
and discrimination’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 32, pp. 
299–328.
Quillian, L 2008, ‘Does unconscious racism exist?’, Social Psychol-
ogy Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 6–11.
}q{+//<]!X!
and the perceived risk of criminal victimization’, Social Psychol-
ogy Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 79–104.
Reskin, BF 2000, ‘Proximate causes of employment discrimination’, 
Contemporary Sociology, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 319–328.
Reskin, BF 2008, ‘Rethinking employment discrimination and its rem-
> \X-
logical perspective, ed. DB Grusky, Westview Press, Boulder, 
pp. 770–779.
Riach, P & Rich, J 2002, ‘Field experiments of discrimination in the 
market place’, The Economic Journal, vol. 112, no. 483, pp. 
480–518.
^q}^+//<{$!
!-
tion: are they ethical?’, Kyklos, vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 457–470.
Rogstad, J 1996, ‘Etikk og metode–noen problemer i studiet av dis-
kriminering’, Sosiologisk tidsskrift, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 219–228.
Rogstad, J 2001, Sist blant likemenn? Synlige minoriteter på arbeids-
markedet, Unipax, Oslo.
Rogstad, J & Midtbøen, AH 2009, Fra symptom til årsak. Metodiske 
utfordringer og forskningsetiske dilemmaer ved bruk av tester i 
studiet av diskriminering, Institutt for samfunnsforskning., ISF-
rapport 2009:002., Oslo.
Rooth, D-O 2007, Implicit discrimination in hiring: real world evi-
cence, in IZA DP#2764, IZA.
Waldinger, R & Lichter, MI 2003, How the other half works: immigra-
tion and the social organization of labor, University of California 
Press, Berkeley.
Yinger, J 1998, ‘Evidence on discrimination in consumer markets’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 23–40.
Zegers de Beijl, R (ed.) 1999, Documenting discrimination against 
migrant workers in the labour market: a comparative study of 

]	

212 Authenticated | 193.157.109.68
Download Date | 10/17/12 1:55 PM
II

1 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCRIMINATION OF THE SECOND GENERATION:  
EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT IN NORWAY* 
 
 
 
 
Arnfinn H. Midtbøen 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
A major question in labour market research is the extent to which discrimination in 
employments causes the disadvantages experienced by children of immigrants. This article 
contributes to the debate by utilising a correspondence test study in which pairs of equivalent 
résumés and cover letters – one with a Pakistani name and one with a Norwegian name – were 
sent in response to 900 job openings in the greater Oslo area. The results show that applicants 
with Norwegian names on average are 25 per cent more likely to receive a call back for a job 
interview than equally qualified applicants with Pakistani names. More refined analyses 
demonstrate that the effect of ethnic background on employment probabilities is larger among 
men than women and larger in the private sector than in the public sector, and important 
variations among the occupations included in the study are revealed. In an effort to separate 
the potentially conflating effects of gender and sector, all applications to gender-segregated 
occupations were removed from the analyses. Interestingly, the gender differences disappear 
when exclusively analysing discrimination in gender-integrated occupations by sector. In 
gender-integrated occupations in the private sector, the gender difference in fact is reversed, 
indicating that women with minority background are treated less favourably than are minority 
men in the private sector. These results suggest that the intersection of gender, ethnicity, and 
sector should be scrutinised more carefully in future field experiments. 
 
Key words: Discrimination; ethnicity; field experiment; second generation; employment 
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Introduction 
Persistent patterns of ethnic inequality represent a continual challenge in European labour 
markets. In particular, the employment opportunities for children of immigrants are a matter 
of growing concern (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Heath et al. 2008; Thomson and Crul 2007). 
Contrary to many of their immigrant parents, the so-called second generation1 usually has 
acquired linguistic fluency and formal domestic education. As such, they have a substantial 
capacity for labour market integration (Alba and Waters 2011a). Nevertheless, recent 
comparative studies suggest that children of immigrants do not have access to employment on 
par with their majority peers (Heath and Cheung 2007; OECD 2010). Because several of the 
factors explaining the challenges facing immigrants in the labour market do not apply to the 
second generation, these findings have resulted in a renewed interest in the question of 
employment discrimination. To what extent does discrimination by employers cause the 
labour market disadvantages currently experienced by children of immigrants?  
 Traditional methods for studying discrimination can only provide indicative answers 
to this question. Surveys of potential victims of unequal treatment may result in both over- 
and under-reported levels of discrimination, surveying employers may conceal the 
discriminatory practices actually taking place, and statistical analyses cannot rule out the 
possibility that omitted variables are biasing the effect attributed to ethnic background (Blank 
et al. 2004, part II; Pager and Shepherd 2008; Quillian 2006). These measurement problems 
have resulted in an increased interest in field experiments in the social sciences. In a field 
experiment, two fictitious job candidates apply for the same job opening. The candidates are 
equally qualified in terms of education and work experience, and are the same sex, the same 
age, etc., but differ in terms of racial appearance or ethnically distinctive names. Insofar as the 
results show a systematic preference for one of the candidates, this is evidence of employment 
discrimination (Pager 2007; Riach and Rich 2002).  
In this article, I present the findings from a field experiment in Norway in which pairs 
of fictitious résumés and cover letters, equal in merit but with different ethnic backgrounds, 
were sent in response to hundreds of job openings in the greater Oslo area. Pakistani names 
were chosen to signal ethnic minority background in the study because Pakistani immigrants 
and their descendants make up a large and well-known minority group in Norway, and survey 
data indicate that this group experiences discrimination in the labour market (Statistics 
                                                          
1 I define the second generation as children of immigrants, either born in their parents’ destination country or 
arrived before adolescence. This definition is in line with Portes and Rumbaut (2005), Thomson and Crul (2007), 
and Alba and Waters (2011a), but differs from Heath and Cheung (2007), who reserve the term exclusively to 
individuals actually born in the ‘host country’ by one or more immigrant parents.   
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Norway 2009b). Furthermore, as children of Pakistani immigrants constitute the largest single 
group among the second generation (34 per cent) and are currently finishing their education 
and entering the labour market (Statistics Norway 2011: 10), exploring the extent to which 
this group faces barriers in accessing employment is particularly relevant when assessing the 
situation for the second generation in Norway. 
Although the body of field experimental research is rapidly increasing, (see recent 
reviews in Charles and Guryan 2011; Levitt and List 2009; Pager 2007), this particular study 
represents at least two novelties. First, there is an explicit focus on the second generation. 
With a few notable exceptions (Carlsson 2010; Fibbi et al. 2006; Kaas and Manger 2012), the 
field experiment methodology has not been used to assess the situation for children of 
immigrants, and none of these studies relates its findings to the existing literature on the 
integration of the second generation in Western Europe. Because the experimental design is 
particularly useful in measuring the extent to which the ethnic background of job candidates 
directly shapes employment prospects, this study complements existing knowledge of the 
labour market barriers facing children of immigrants. 
Second, it is the first field experiment of employment discrimination ever conducted in 
a Norwegian context.2 Norway is a relatively young net immigration country with a 
traditionally quite homogenous population (Brochmann and Kjeldstadli 2008), and the second 
generation has just recently entered the labour market (Statistics Norway 2011). In line with 
previous research on discrimination rates in the European periphery (e.g. McGinnity and 
Lunn 2011), this might suggest widespread discrimination of ethnic minorities. At the same 
time, Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a well-regulated labour market 
historically oriented towards egalitarian principles and a ‘passion for equality’ (Graubard 
1986), which could have a positive impact on the integration of the children of immigrants. 
Important characteristics of the Norwegian context thereby point in different directions when 
it comes to predicting the general employment outcomes for the second generation, making 
empirical examination of discrimination patterns in the Norwegian labour market an 
interesting case for analysis. 
I proceed by providing a short review of the literature on the second generation, its 
theoretical development, and important empirical characteristics. Then, I introduce the field 
experiment methodology and present the research design and the key results of this particular 
study, highlighting important variations in discrimination rates between the private and the 
                                                          
2 However, one former field experiment has explored the role of discrimination in the Norwegian housing market 
(Andersson et al. 2012).  
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public sectors, between men and women, and across occupations. In the conclusion, I discuss 
the findings in light of the theoretical and empirical literature on trajectories of labour market 
integration among the second generation in Western Europe. 
 
Previous research on the second generation 
A major debate among migration scholars over the past two decades has concerned the extent 
to which children of immigrants will assimilate into mainstream society, or face 
disadvantages similar to, or worse than, their parents. Starting out with notions of a ‘second-
generation decline’ (Gans 1992) and ‘segmented assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou 1993), 
influential theorists predicted that significant numbers of the children of immigrants arriving 
in the United States after 1965 would be incorporated into marginalised sectors of the 
economy. This pessimistic scenario was later criticised by scholars arguing that the second 
generation is rather absorbed into and contributes to redefining the ‘American mainstream’ 
(e.g. Alba and Nee 2003; Waldinger and Perlmann 1998). However, recent empirical results 
have supported the theory of segmented assimilation by documenting that there are indeed 
different ‘modes of incorporation’ within the second generation; some groups experience 
upward mobility while others assimilate into poverty and marginalised positions in the U.S. 
labour market (Portes et al. 2005, 2009).  
The theoretical models used to explain the trajectories of adaptation among children of 
immigrants were, for many years, dominated by American scholars and developed to 
understand the particular U.S. context. Recently, however, the applicability of these theories 
to Western Europe has been questioned (e.g. Alba 2005; Alba and Waters 2011b; Crul et al. 
2012; Heath et al. 2008; Thomson and Crul 2007). In line with the optimistic scenario, a 
comparative study investigating educational merits and labour market outcomes among 
children of immigrants in several European countries suggests that the second generation on 
average is experiencing upward mobility compared to their parents (Heath and Cheung 2007). 
Yet there are large variations between groups; children of immigrants from less-developed 
countries seem to be severely disadvantaged, indicating that different modes of incorporation 
are also a reality in the European context (Heath et al. 2008).  
A major contribution of the European research has been to highlight the importance of 
national and institutional variation in determining the opportunities and barriers facing 
children of immigrants. In some countries, such as Austria, Belgium, and Germany, the 
second generation seems to experience cumulative patterns of disadvantage even after 
employment is secured, while in others, such as Britain and Sweden, the barriers mainly exist 
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at the entrance to the labour market (Heath et al. 2008: 220). In Norway, a recent study 
following the design used by Heath and Cheung (2007) suggests that children of non-
European immigrants have a lower probability of being employed compared to equally 
qualified majority peers, even after controlling for social origin (Hermansen 2013; see also 
Evensen 2009). Yet they do not seem to face cumulative disadvantages, adding Norway to the 
list of countries in which the barriers to labour market inclusion seem to be highest at the 
entrance level (Hermansen 2013: 14).  
While the above-mentioned empirical studies demonstrate the fact that children of 
immigrants all over Western Europe experience ‘ethnic penalties’ in accessing labour market 
opportunities, the relevance of employment discrimination in explaining these findings is 
unclear. Traditional quantitative approaches to the study of ethnic disparities cannot rule out 
alternative interpretations of the disadvantages observed (e.g. Pager and Shepherd 2008). 
Although children of immigrants should be highly employable because they have usually 
acquired fluency in the majority language as well as domestic educational qualifications and 
work experience, they might lack, for example, the social networks needed to access parts of 
the labour market (Petersen et al. 2000). Thus, the extent to which discrimination causes the 
disadvantages observed is a question which traditional statistical approaches cannot answer.  
 
The field experiment methodology – strengths and limitations 
The field experiment methodology offers a more direct approach when compared with the 
indirect measures of discrimination that characterise quantitative studies. Field experiments 
appear in two main forms: audit studies and correspondence studies. In audit studies (called 
‘situation testing’ in the series of studies conducted by ILO in the 1990s), pairs of individuals 
who are matched in terms of relevant productivity characteristics, but who differ in racial 
visibility, apply for real-world jobs by appearing in person (e.g. Pager 2003; Pager et al. 
2009). In correspondence studies, matched pairs of résumés differing in the names of the 
applicants (signalling different race or ethnicity) are sent in response to job openings (e.g. 
Andriessen et al. 2012; Oreopoulos 2011). In both types, the direct effect of race or ethnicity 
on employment opportunities is measured, and because all other factors are isolated and the 
résumés are randomly assigned to the test persons, well-conducted field experiments provide 
convincing estimates of the prevalence of racial or ethnic discrimination in specific labour 
markets (Quillian 2006: 303). 
It is important to note that the concept of discrimination implicit in field experiments 
differs somewhat from the standard definition of discrimination, which refers to the unequal 
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treatment of individuals or groups on the grounds of their ethnic background. Because field 
experiments used for research purposes construct situations or ‘tests’ in which employers are 
considering paired résumés of identical quality, the single act of choosing one candidate in 
favour of another may be the result of a coincidence. As Pager and Western (2012: 233) 
argue, the strength of field experiments is not to detect discriminatory tendencies of any given 
employer (which would require multiple tests of the same employer), but to explore whether 
minority applicants are systematically disadvantaged in accessing employment. Furthermore, 
although providing a ‘clean’ estimate of discrimination in hiring, field experiments do not 
measure differential treatment in processes of wage negotiation, promotion, and firing – nor 
do they shed light on neutral rules with disparate impact on different groups, or workplace 
cultures characterised by in-group favouritism (see e.g. Craig 2007 and Sturm 2001 for these 
aspects of discrimination). In sum, field experiments measure the average effect of race or 
ethnically distinct names on employment opportunities. 
 Despite its advantages, the field experiment tradition has also been the subject of 
debate. Some scholars point to the deceptive character of the method, discussing the ethical 
problems attached to presenting fictitious job candidates to employers (e.g. Banton 1997; 
Riach and Rich 2004; Rogstad 1996). Others are concerned with the researcher’s ability to 
construct real-world test persons as well as with the representativeness of the results due to 
the limited part of the labour market that has been subjected to experimental research 
(Heckman 1998; Heckman and Siegelman 1993). However, most of these challenges relate to 
in-person audit studies. In correspondence studies, employers are never confronted with actual 
individuals, making the ethical problems less prominent (although they do not disappear) and 
eliminating the potential biasing effects of different performance levels and first impressions. 
Moreover, because correspondence studies allow for more tests in a broader portion of the 
labour market, the problem of representativeness is less decisive (see Midtbøen and Rogstad 
2012 for a detailed account of these points). Of course, audit studies have the benefit of 
observing employment processes to the actual hiring stage, while correspondence studies 
measure differences in job interview offers (so-called call-back gaps). Still, a review of 
existing field experiments suggests that the level of discrimination is highest in the call-back 
stage of the application process (Riach and Rich 2002: 494), making this limitation less 
important. 
A major disadvantage of correspondence studies concerns uncertainty as to what a 
name represents in practice. In a much cited correspondence study from the U.S. (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2004), ‘African-American’ and ‘White-sounding’ names were used to 
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signal racial differences between the fictitious applicants. As the authors discuss, the names 
could also signal different social backgrounds, indicating that employers may be inferring 
class differences rather than racial differences from the names, which potentially could bias 
the measured effect of race on employment prospects (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004: 
1007).  
In a European context, field experiments usually measure the prevalence of ethnic 
rather than racial discrimination. However, there is no straightforward relationship between 
names and ethnicity. For the employers, a foreign name may evoke associations to nationality 
or religion, not only to ethnic background. For example, although Pakistani names signal 
ethnic minority background in this field experiment, the names may also signal a more 
general Muslim background. Furthermore, operationalising ethnic minority background by 
Pakistani names challenges the ability to generalise the findings to other ethnic groups. 
Social-psychological research has suggested that ethnic groups which are considered 
culturally and socially deviant are ranked lower than others (Snellman and Ekehammar 2005), 
and there are reasons to suspect that Muslims are particularly low-ranked in European 
countries today (Adida et al. 2012). A Muslim name may thus evoke stronger prejudices and 
lead to higher discrimination rates than would a non-Muslim foreign name.  
Previous field experiments provide a rather mixed picture when assessing the 
relevance of ethnic hierarchies in employers’ decision-making. Some studies report different 
discrimination rates between ethnic groups (e.g. Booth et al. 2012; Fibbi et al. 2006) while 
others conclude that the differences between groups are surprisingly small (e.g. Andriessen et 
al. 2012; Bursell 2012). In Ireland, most notably, McGinnity and Lunn (2011) found that 
fictitious applicants with Irish names were more than twice as likely to receive a call back as 
applicants with foreign names, but no significant differences were found between applicants 
with African, Asian, and German names. These contradictory results serve as a reminder that 
although the field experiment literature often refers to general notions of ‘ethnic 
discrimination’, what a correspondence study precisely measures is the probability of 
receiving a job interview offer for fictitious applicants with particular foreign names 
compared with equally qualified applicants with native names.  
In this study, the minority applicants have Pakistani names, and the discrimination 
rates are not directly transferable to other groups. However, as the fictitious job candidates are 
young (25 years), the résumés and cover letters are written in fluent Norwegian and all 
schooling and work experiences are from Norway, the minority applicants represent credible 
descendants of Pakistani immigrants applying for work. Thus, the findings shed light on the 
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employment opportunities of a large section of the second generation in Norway, currently 
finishing their education and entering the labour market.  
Obviously, employers may not perceive the fictitious applicants as children of 
immigrants. Qualitative research suggests that the second generation appears ‘invisible’ in the 
eyes of Norwegian employers, indicating that applicants with foreign names are perceived as 
immigrants regardless of what is stated in their résumés (Midtbøen forthcoming). A recent 
field experiment in Sweden (Carlsson 2010) has further documented significant call-back 
gaps between applicants with native Swedish names and Arabic names, but no differences 
between minority applicants from the first and second generation, suggesting a lacking 
awareness of children of immigrants as prospective applicants. Still, these findings should not 
keep researchers from conducting field experiments to measure the extent to which children 
of immigrants are discriminated against in employment processes. If second generation 
applicants are perceived as immigrants, and it constitutes a significant barrier to receiving job 
interview offers, then this perception represents a major challenge to the structural inclusion 
of ethnic minorities, which should be addressed by empirical research and receive more 
attention in public debate.   
 
Research design 
Constructing pairs of fictitious job candidates 
The main objective of a field experiment is to isolate the causal effect of ethnic background 
on employment prospects. In a correspondence study, this entails the challenge of 
constructing pairs of résumés and cover letters that are equal in all factors other than the 
name, but which at the same time are both different and reliable – to be perceived by 
employers as two actual candidates applying for the same job. 
In this study, these requirements were met in the following way. The fictitious job 
candidates in each pair had similar educational merits, work experience, and language and 
computer skills. Text was written in fluent Norwegian, and the candidates always met the 
formal requirements listed in the job advertisement. The only practical difference between the 
two applicants was their names, with one applicant in each pair having a Pakistani name and 
the other a native Norwegian name.3 As mentioned above, Pakistani names were chosen to 
represent ‘ethnic minority background’ in the study because Pakistani immigrants and their 
children constitute one of the largest minority groups in Norway, and Norwegian-born 
                                                          
3 The Pakistani names used in the experiment were Kamran Ahmad and Saera Rashid; the Norwegian names 
were Andreas Hansen and Ida Johansen. 
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individuals with a Pakistani background constitute by far the largest group among the second 
generation (Statistics Norway 2011). As such, using Pakistani names increased the probability 
that employers considered the fictitious minority applicants as being children of immigrants.  
To make the fictitious résumés and cover letters in each pair look different, cosmetic 
adjustments were made. While keeping the content of the paired applications identical, the 
fonts varied, and the order of listed qualifications in the résumés and the exact wording in the 
cover letters were somewhat different. Obviously, this could result in a measurement error 
due to potential quality differences within each pair. To avoid any systematic relationship 
between signatures and texts, however, the names of the applicants were randomly assigned to 
the documents. Furthermore, as each job application consisted of one résumé and one cover 
letter, the combination of these two documents was switched halfway through the experiment. 
Consequently, any systematic difference in call-back rates between the fictitious applicants is 
attributed to their different names and interpreted as an effect of discrimination.  
Finally, the reliability of both résumés and cover letters was ensured by presenting 
first drafts to experienced recruitment personnel. Based on their advice concerning both 
appropriateness and equivalence, paired templates were obtained for each occupation. In 
practice, new skills (e.g. familiarity with specific computer programmes) were added when 
necessary, and the wording in the cover letters was slightly adjusted to fit each job posting.  
 
Gender, sector, and occupation 
Recent field experiments have suggested that discrimination rates are affected by occupational 
characteristics and the gender of the applicants (e.g. Andriessen et al. 2012; Bursell 2012). To 
explore whether the effect of ethnic minority background also varies with gender, sector, or 
occupation in the Norwegian labour market, two pairs of fictitious résumés and cover letters – 
one female pair and one male pair – were sent in response to job opportunities in twelve 
occupational categories in both the private and the public sectors. The sample included jobs 
requiring a low skill level (e.g. auxiliary nurses, warehouse workers, and drivers) and jobs 
requiring three to four years of formal education (e.g. primary school teachers, financial 
controllers, and IT advisors). 
 Compared to many other countries, a high percentage of the adult population in 
Norway is employed. This is mostly due to the large proportion of working women; seven out 
of ten women and almost eight out of ten men are currently employed. However, the 
Norwegian labour market is characterised by quite high levels of occupational gender 
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segregation (EGGE 2009). Women dominate the large public sector, in which more than 30 
per cent of the total workforce is employed (Statistics Norway 2009a).  
These characteristics of the Norwegian labour market were considered when 
implementing the field experiment. To not ‘disturb’ the treatment variable (ethnicity), the 
structure of occupational gender segregation was considered in the sense that the pair of 
fictitious female job candidates applied to occupations dominated by women (e.g. within 
health and social work), while the pair of male candidates applied to occupations already 
dominated by men (e.g. transport and warehousing). This way, situations in which minority 
applicants of the under-represented gender were preferred or rejected based on gender, rather 
than ethnic background, were avoided.  
The disadvantage of this strategy is, however, that the discrimination rates in female 
and male dominated occupations cannot be compared directly, and that what appears as 
gender effects may in fact be the effect of sector or occupational characteristics. Therefore, 
more gender-balanced occupations in financial services, teaching, communications, and 
public administration were also included in the sample.4 To these occupations, both the 
female and the male pairs of fictitious applicants were sent (although not to the same job 
vacancies), enabling an opportunity to explore possible gendered effects of ethnic 
discrimination. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of résumés, by gender and 
occupation.  
 
Table 1 Number of résumés, by gender and occupation 
Occupation Women Men Total 
Female-dominated occupations    
Pre-school teacher 262 0 262 
Nurse  192 0 192 
Auxiliary nurse 40 0 40 
Male-dominated occupations    
IT Advisor 0 218 218 
Warehouse worker 0 144 144 
Driver  0 100 100 
Gender-balanced occupations    
Primary school teacher 84 56 140 
Public consultant 56 40 96 
Information officer 16 98 114 
Accounting assistant  94 130 224 
Insurance advisor 56 94 150 
Controller 48 72 120 
Total 848 952 1800 
 
                                                          
4 In the six industries covered in this field experiment, the share of women is as follows: health and social work 
(82.1 per cent), teaching (62.7 per cent), public administration (47.4 per cent), finance and insurance (43.1 per 
cent), information and communications (29.5 per cent), and transport and logistics (21.4 per cent). The numbers 
have been collected from Statistics Norway’s Labour Force Survey 2011. The main findings from this survey are 
available in English: http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/06/01/yrkeaku_en/.  
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Implementing the field experiment 
Employers were sampled from job postings on the main recruitment websites in Norway – 
finn.no (private) and nav.no (state funded). In principle, the experiment included every job 
listed on these websites within the twelve occupational categories, in the greater Oslo area, 
and in the period the data were collected. However, there were a few exceptions to this rule. 
Some employers had several listings in this period, and unless they were large corporations 
divided into different sections with their own recruitment personnel, only one pair of 
applications was sent to each listing.  
Each of the four fictitious job candidates had a real cell phone number and e-mail 
address as well as a fictitious postal address, and these contact details were included on each 
résumé. The documents were primarily sent from the fictitious applicants’ e-mail addresses or 
uploaded to the recruitment websites. However, a substantial number (29 per cent) of the 
companies did not allow documents to be uploaded. Instead, they had forms where applicants 
were required to register their contact information, résumés, and brief statements describing 
why they were suited for the job. Although this process was time consuming, companies 
using these recruitment procedures were also included in the sample, because public 
companies were over-represented in this group and it was desirable to compare call-back rates 
between the public and private sectors. 
Employers contacting the fictitious applicants on cell phones were directed to a 
personal voice mail presenting (in fluent Norwegian) the name of the applicant and 
encouraging contact information to be shared. The research team monitored all voice mails 
and e-mails at least once a day. When the applicants received a job interview offer, the 
responses were carefully registered and matched with the data on each test (e.g. date of test, 
company name and address, job type, listed requirements, and gender of the applicant). 
Depending on whether the responses were given via phone or e-mail, the interview offers 
were politely refused by text message or e-mail. Because the postal addresses were fictitious, 
any attempts by employers to contact the applicants by post could not be measured, but 
previous research has suggested that this probably had minor effects on the overall results, 
since very few employers today contact applicants by ordinary mail (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004: 997).5 
                                                          
5 Subsequent interviews with a subsample of the employers included in this field experiment confirmed that this 
is also the case in the Norwegian labour market context. 
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As Andriessen et al. (2012: 249) note, a call back by phone is not necessarily 
synonymous with a job interview offer. For example, employers may want to let applicants 
know in person that they are not suitable for a job. Thus, employers who left a message asking 
the applicant to call back received a text message or an e-mail to determine whether the 
enquiry was equivalent to a job interview offer. In the vast majority of cases, a call back was 
indeed meant for a job interview, and the employers’ response was registered as such. This 
extra effort resulted in a clear dependant variable measuring the rate of job interview offers 
rather than the more ambiguous call-back rate, which has been most frequently used in the 
field experiment literature.  
 
Experimental results 
Descriptive results 
The correspondence study was conducted between November 2009 and November 2010, and 
the paired, fictitious résumés and cover letters were sent in response to a total number of 900 
job openings. Each test had four possible outcomes: neither of the applicants is invited for a 
job interview, both are invited, only the majority candidate is invited, or only the minority 
candidate is invited. The first row in Table 2 shows the aggregate distribution of outcomes. In 
497 out of 900 cases, neither of the fictitious candidates received a job interview offer, while 
both candidates were invited in 269 cases. In 116 cases, the applicant with a Norwegian name 
was the only one receiving a job interview offer, while in 18 cases, only the applicant with a 
Pakistani name was invited.  
This difference in job interview offers between the two fictitious candidates results in 
a so-called ‘net discrimination rate’ of 24.3 per cent [Column 6]. This is a measure calculated 
by dividing the difference between the positive responses where only the majority candidate 
was preferred [4] and the positive responses where only the minority applicant was preferred 
[5], by the sum of all positive responses [3]+[4]+[5]. However, what this measure of 
discrimination actually means is somewhat unclear, and there is an on-going controversy 
about how it should be calculated (see Heckman 1998; Riach and Rich 2002). Therefore, I 
prefer the measures used in the American field experiment literature (e.g. Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004; Tilcsik 2011), which simply compare the percentage difference in 
positive call backs between the applicants. This way, a meaningful and easily interpreted 
measure of ethnic discrimination – the probability of receiving a job interview offer for the 
minority candidate relative to that of the majority candidate – is provided. 
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As columns [7] and [8] in the first row of Table 2 demonstrate, the fictitious job 
candidates with a Norwegian name were invited to a job interview 42.8 per cent of the time, 
while the applicants with a Pakistani name were invited 31.9 per cent of the time. This 
difference of 10.9 percentage points implies that having a Pakistani name reduces the 
probability of receiving a job interview offer by 25.5 per cent. Being statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level, the call-back gap between equally qualified job candidates clearly 
demonstrates that children of Pakistani immigrants do experience discrimination at the 
entrance to the Norwegian labour market. This overall finding effectively expands our 
knowledge of what causes the previously documented ‘ethnic penalties’ experienced by this 
group in Norway (Hermansen 2013.  
However, the remaining rows in Table 2 demonstrate that there are large variations in 
the experimental results. Separating the results by gender suggests that ethnic discrimination 
is far more prevalent among the fictitious male applicants than among their female 
counterparts. Among the male pairs of applicants, the majority candidate had a 30.3 per cent 
chance of receiving a positive response from employers; the minority candidate had only a 
17.8 per cent chance. Thus, a Pakistani name reduces the likelihood of being invited to a job 
interview by 41.3 per cent compared to an equally qualified candidate with a Norwegian 
name. Among women, the effect of ethnic background is much less pronounced. A Pakistani 
name reduced the probability of receiving a call back by 16.5 per cent for women, although 
both call-back gaps are statistically significant (p<.01).  
The differences in responses between the private and the public sectors are even more 
striking. In the private sector, the probability of receiving a job interview offer for applicants 
with Pakistani names is reduced by 36.1 per cent compared to applicants with Norwegian 
names (p<.01). In the public sector, the call-back gap between the candidates is small and not 
significant at all. Furthermore, the last 12 rows in Table 2 document a considerable 
occupational variation. For example, in applications for job openings as drivers and 
warehouse workers, applicants with Pakistani names had a 57.7 and a 55.6 per cent less 
chance, respectively, of receiving a call back, while the effects of ethnic background in 
occupations like pre-school teacher, nurse, and public consultant are small and not significant.  
In line with a recent field experiment in the Dutch labour market (Andriessen et al. 
2012), there is a tendency for the extent of discrimination to be greater in low-skilled jobs 
than in jobs requiring higher education. Interestingly, however, the greatest ‘ethnic penalty’ 
occurs in applications for positions as financial controllers. This occupational category 
requires at least three years of higher education, indicating that there is no straightforward 
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relationship between discrimination rates and educational level. Furthermore, the large 
differences across occupations clearly demonstrate that the overall findings from field 
experiments should be interpreted with caution, as the occupations included in a sample may 
have major effects on the discrimination rates derived from the experiment.  
 
Disentangling the effects of gender, sector, and occupation 
In a recent paper presenting a correspondence study of gender discrimination in Britain, Riach 
and Rich (2006) note that the logical imperative of field experiments is to design and match 
paired résumés in a way that controls for all factors, other than the name, which may affect 
the rate of job interview offers. Because the fictitious résumés in each pair are identical in 
terms of human capital characteristics, any systematic preference for either of the candidates 
is attributable to the name difference, and the data cannot be controlled for more formally, e.g. 
by regression analysis. Thus, according to Riach and Rich (2006: 6), ‘the scientific challenge 
in field experiments is careful ex ante design; not ex post statistical manipulation’. 
Still, there is need for more detailed empirical analyses. The numbers in Table 2 do 
not clarify whether the effect of ethnic background on call-back rates is in fact larger in, for 
example, the private sector than in the public sector, or mainly an effect of gender or 
occupational characteristics. Because the fictitious résumés and cover letters from the male 
pairs of applicants were often sent in response to job openings in male-dominated occupations 
in the private sector, while the female pairs mainly applied to female-dominated occupations 
in the public sector, the relative effects of gender, sector, and occupation on the overall results 
are conflated. Therefore, as a first step, all applications to gender-segregated occupations were 
removed from the analysis. The gender-integrated occupations in the sample consisted of 
primary school teachers, public consultants, accounting assistants, insurance advisors, 
information officers, and financial controllers. For these positions, both the fictitious male and 
female pairs of job candidates applied (cf. Table 1), and the call-back rates between men and 
women are more directly comparable.  
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Table 3 Call-back rates, by ethnic background in gender-integrated occupations. Separate numbers 
for men and women in the private and the public sectors 
 % Call back   
Sample (n=Job ads) Majority Minority Ratio Percentage points 
difference 
Both private and public sectors     
Total (n=408) 34.9 23.7 1.47 11.2** 
Men (n=233) 28.8 18.4 1.57 10.4** 
Women (n=175) 43.4 30.9 1.40 12.5** 
Private sector     
Total (n=257) 32.3 17.7 1.82 14.6** 
Men (n=156) 31.0 18.4 1.68 12.6** 
Women (n=101) 34.9 16.5 2.12 18.4** 
Public sector     
Total (n=151) 36.5 33.1 1.10 3.4 
Men (n=74) 19.5 16.9 1.15 2.6 
Women (n=77) 54.1 50 1.08 4.1 
**=p<.01 
 
 
Table 3 shows the call-back rates by ethnic background in gender-integrated occupations. The 
first row demonstrates that the negative effect of a Pakistani name on call-back rates increases 
when exploring only this occupational subsample. For the total numbers, the probability of 
receiving a job interview offer is reduced by 32.1 per cent for applicants with Pakistani names 
compared to equally qualified applicants with Norwegian names. Separating these numbers 
by gender, the next two rows demonstrate that although the gender difference is clearly 
smaller when omitting the gender-segregated occupations from the analysis, a certain pattern 
of gender difference persists. A Pakistani name reduces the probability of receiving a job 
interview offer by 36.1 per cent for men and 28.8 per cent for women.  
However, separating the results for gender-integrated occupations by sector provides 
some interesting results. The mid-rows of Table 3 display the results for the private sector. 
Here, the effect of ethnic background is large and statistically significant for the total number 
of applications, and the gender differences are actually switched: The probability of receiving 
a call back for applicants with Pakistani names is reduced by 52 per cent for women and 40 
per cent for men. Thus, in contrast to what the overall findings suggest, minority women do 
not seem to be treated more favourably than minority men when applying for jobs in gender-
integrated occupations in the private sector.  
In the public sector, the picture is different. Here, the effect of ethnic background is 
minimal and the call-back gaps by ethnicity are not statistically significant for women or men. 
Interestingly, however, the female applicant pairs are invited to job interviews in gender-
integrated occupations far more often than the male pairs. In fact, minority women receive a 
call back more than twice as often as majority men.  
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The results presented in Table 3 suggest that the negative effect of a Pakistani name on 
the probability of receiving a job interview offer is much larger in gender-integrated 
occupations in the private sector than in the public sector, and that the gendered effect of 
ethnic discrimination seems to disappear when separating the results by sector. In order to 
explore the net effect of ethnic background and sector in gender-integrated occupations, I use 
a linear probability model on call backs (defined as a binary variable in which 1 equals a call 
back by employers). In Table 4, Model 1 displays the effect of a Pakistani name on the 
probability of receiving a job interview offer, controlling for gender, sector, and occupation. 
Model 2, moreover, tests the findings in Table 3 by accounting for the interaction effects 
between a Pakistani name and sector while controlling for gender and occupation. 
 
Table 4 Linear probability of receiving a call back in gender-integrated occupations 
 Call back Model 1 Model 2 
Pakistani name -0.11*** -0.033 
Private sector 0.145*** 0.207*** 
Pakistani name*private sector -0.123* 
Male -0.071* -0.071* 
Insurance advisor -0.389*** -0.389*** 
Accounting assistant -0.419*** -0.419*** 
Controller -0.602*** -0.602*** 
Public consultant -0.41*** -0.41*** 
Information officer -0.61*** -0.61*** 
Constant 0.687*** 0.648*** 
Number of applications 816 816 
R2 0.17 0.17 
*= p<.05, ** =p< .01, **** p<.001 
Note: The reference category is the average call-back rate for female applicants with Norwegian names applying 
for positions as primary school teachers in the public sector.  
 
 
In Model 1, the first row shows that when applying for jobs in gender-integrated occupations, 
the probability of receiving a job interview offer for applicants with Pakistani names is 
reduced by 11 percentage points compared to applicants with Norwegian names. The second 
row demonstrates that applicants with Norwegian names in the private sector are 14.5 
percentage points more likely to receive a call back than applicants with Pakistani names, 
controlling for gender and occupation. Finally, the third row shows that male applicants – 
when controlling for name, sector, and occupation – in general have a call-back probability 
that is seven percentage points lower than call backs for female applicants. 
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In Model 2, the first row reports the effect of a Pakistani name on call-back 
probabilities in the public sector, controlling for gender and occupation. Being a minor and 
not significant effect, this model supports the finding that ethnic background does not affect 
call-back rates in the public sector. This is further strengthened by the statistically significant 
interaction effect for a Pakistani name and private sector, suggesting that applicants with 
Pakistani names are experiencing lower call-back probabilities (-12.3 percentage points) in 
gender-integrated occupations in the private sector, irrespective of gender and occupation.  
Of course, these numbers are based on a relatively small sample of occupations, and 
one should be cautious in drawing firm conclusions about how job candidates are received 
when applying for positions in the private and the public sectors in general. Furthermore, the 
small and statistically not significant call-back gaps in the public sector do not necessarily 
imply an absence of discrimination; they may reflect that discrimination is more widespread 
in promotion than in recruitment, as suggested by previous research (Byron 2010). However, 
a recent field experiment in the Swedish labour market (Ahmed et al. 2013) reports that 
discrimination is more prevalent in the private sector, indicating that discrimination rates may 
indeed vary between the sectors. It is also worth remembering that a female workforce 
dominates the public sector in Norway. The fact that the female pairs of fictitious job 
applicants received job interview offers far more often than the male pairs when applying for 
the same type of public position may suggest a general employer preference for women in the 
public sector – regardless of ethnic background.  
 
Concluding discussion 
Ethnic inequalities in European labour markets persist despite the rapid development of anti-
discrimination legislation, political integration efforts, and impressive educational 
achievements among the second generation in many countries. Yet the extent to which 
employment discrimination may account for the disadvantages experienced by children of 
immigrants is notoriously difficult to assess. A number of traditional quantitative studies have 
documented that the second generation in Europe does face ‘ethnic penalties’ when compared 
to equally qualified majority peers, particularly at the entrance to the labour market (see 
review in Heath et al. 2008). Nevertheless, these studies cannot rule out alternative 
explanations for the observed disadvantages; for example, omitted variables or ethnic 
differences in the access to social networks may explain the disparities in employment 
reported.  
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 Presenting the main findings from the first field experiment conducted in the 
Norwegian labour market, this article documents that discrimination is indeed a relevant 
explanation for ethnic inequality. By sending 900 pairs of fictitious résumés and cover letters, 
with equal merits, but with names signalling different ethnic backgrounds, this study has 
demonstrated that children of Pakistani immigrants have a 25 per cent lower probability of 
receiving a job interview offer compared to equally qualified applicants with Norwegian 
names. This complements the findings from previous quantitative studies (Evensen 2009; 
Hermansen 2013), suggesting that employment discrimination indeed is an important 
contributor to the barriers facing the second generation at the entrance to the labour market in 
Norway.  
This study sheds light on the employment prospects for young individuals with 
Pakistani names in the particular Norwegian context, and cannot easily be transferred to other 
groups or compared to other countries. A Pakistani name may, in the eyes of employers, 
signal that a job candidate belongs to a certain ethnic group, but the name could also signal, 
for example, a more general Muslim background. If this is the case, what is measured here is 
a reluctance to hire young Muslims, and the employer preference for applicants with 
Norwegian names may be more pronounced when compared to applicants with Pakistani or 
Muslim names than when compared to other ethnic or religious groups. However, as some 
former field experiments have reported considerable differences between groups while others 
have not, comparing call-back gaps between native Norwegians and only one minority group 
makes it impossible to predict the differences in discrimination rates among other groups in 
the Norwegian labour market. Consequently, this study cannot determine whether children of 
Pakistani immigrants are the subject of particularly high levels of discrimination, or whether it 
is just a foreign name – no matter what ethnic or religious group it signals – which creates the 
barrier to employment.  
The empirical analyses suggested that the effect of ethnic background on employment 
probabilities were large and statistically significant in gender-integrated occupations in the 
private sector, but small and not significant in the public sector. This is interesting for several 
reasons. First, recent studies have suggested that minority men are more exposed to 
employment discrimination than are women (e.g. Andriessen et al. 2012; Bursell 2012). At 
first glance, the results of this study support these findings. However, the gender differences 
disappear when separating gender-integrated occupations by sector. In gender-integrated 
occupations in the private sector, the gender difference is even reversed, indicating that 
women with a minority background are treated less favourably than minority men in the 
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private sector. These results suggest that the interaction of gender, ethnicity, and sector should 
be scrutinised more carefully in future field experiments.  
Second, the public/private sector divide is interesting because the public sector in 
Norway is large compared to most European countries – more than 30 per cent of the total 
workforce is employed in public companies – and it is well known for the relatively high 
levels of formal education required for permanent employment (Statistics Norway 2009a). 
Because the fictitious job candidates used in this experiment were always given the 
qualifications required, the small and not significant call-back gaps in applications to public 
positions indicate that the public sector may serve as an important employment arena for the 
second generation in the years to come. Furthermore, it serves as a reminder that the size of 
the public sector may prove important in determining the level of discrimination experienced 
by children of immigrants in different countries, indicating that sector differences should 
receive more attention in comparative research on integration and discrimination. 
Finally, highlighting the large public sector as a distinctive feature of the Norwegian 
labour market is relevant to the literature on children of immigrants in Europe, as it relates to 
the on-going discussion about the relevance of integration contexts. Considering the 
differences in education systems, labour market regulations, and welfare state arrangements in 
European countries, a major question concerns the extent to which institutional contexts 
influence the trajectories of integration (Crul et al. 2012). Previous research has pointed to 
Sweden and Norway as examples of countries in which access to labour market opportunities 
has proved difficult for children of immigrants, but where there are few indications of 
cumulative disadvantage once employment is secured (Heath and Cheung 2007; Hermansen 
2013; Reisel et al. 2012). Future research should consider the opportunities for conducting 
comparative field experiments to explore the link between the welfare state and integration 
regimes and the modes of incorporation experienced by the second generation in Europe. 
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